TJLP (Winter 2005)  Volume 1 Number 2 by unknown
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
Volume 1 
Issue 2 Winter 2005 Article 1 
January 2005 
TJLP (Winter 2005) Volume 1 Number 2 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(2005) "TJLP (Winter 2005) Volume 1 Number 2," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , 
Article 1. 
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss2/1 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL 
Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information, 
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp. 
TD
7ennassw au~rna f Lw& OC
Wo IN 2005
Volume I Number 2 [ 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL 1: 2
THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY is published four times
per year and edited by students of the University of Tennessee College
of Law. The publisher is THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY,
1505 W. Cumberland Ave., Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-1810. The
subscription rate is $30.00 per volume, $8.00 per single issue. Unless
notice to the contrary is received, THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW &
POLICY assumes that a renewal of the subscription is desired. All
claims of non-receipt of an issue should be made within six months of
date of publication if claimant wishes to avoid paying for the missing
issue. To order back issues, contact THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW
& POLICY, 1505 W. Cumberland Ave., Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-
1810. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to: THE TENNESSEE
JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, 1505 W. Cumberland Ave., Knoxville,
Tennessee 37996-1810.
Copyright © 2004, TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, University
of Tennessee College of Law. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.law.utk.edu/students/tjlp/tjlphome.htm
2
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL I: 2
ARTICLE








UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE PRO BONO
The Honorable E. Riley Anderson
NOTE
THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT: ADDRESSING




TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL 1: 2
THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY
2004-2005 Editorial Staff
Editorial Board
LEONARD O. EVANS III
Editor-In-Chief























GEORGE EDWARD S. PETTIGREW
ANGELA J. WILLIAMS
5
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL- I: 2




OTIS H. STEPHENS, PH.D.
Alumni Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science
and Resident Scholar of Constitutional Law
University of Tennessee College ofLaw Administration
THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.
Dean and Alvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law
JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR.
Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law
and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
RACHEL E. INMAN




Publication of contributions does not signify adoption of the views expressed therein by
the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & PoLIcY, its editors, or the University of Tennessee
College of Law.
6
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL I: 2 183
Editor's Note
In our Fall 2004 Issue, the JOURNAL included a Note
analyzing Cone v. Bell, 359 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2004). See 1
TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 153 (2004). On January 24, 2005, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Cone. The Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's
affirmance of a death sentence imposed based on the jury's
finding that murders were "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" was not contrary to clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. See Bell v. Cone, 125 S. Ct. 847 (2005).
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I. Introduction
All intentional torts are governed by three basic
principles: (1) intent is a necessary and sufficient basis for
holding someone liable; (2) each intentional tort must
* Paul E. Treusch Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of
Law. I would like to thank Southwestern University School of Law for
supporting this project with a sabbatical leave and a summer research
grant.
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violate its own specific behavioral rule; and (3) all
intentional torts require proof of the defendant's fault.
Together, these principles appear to make intentional tort
law both unique and self-contained. The first principle
justifies creating an intentional tort theory of recovery. The
second principle distinguishes that theory from negligence,
which bases liability on the fixed standard of reasonable
care. The third principle separates intentional torts from
the no-fault theory of strict liability.
Of course, this jurisprudential scheme has never been as
perfect as it sounds. Like any classification system, it
contains some obvious anomalies. For example, the
concept of tortious intent, defined as scienter, includes
behavior which is clearly not purposeful.1 In addition, the
doctrine of transferred intent creates a legal fiction that
artificially shifts intent from one person to another.2 More
discretely, the mistake doctrine imputes intent to persons
whose conduct clearly is unintentional. 3
Until now, these anomalies have been viewed as rather
trivial blemishes on an otherwise healthy corpusjuris. In
this article, however, I intend to show that the flaws in
intentional tort law are far greater in number, and far more
serious, than previously imagined. Indeed, they are so
numerous and substantial, they actually undercut each of
the law's three sustaining tenets.
The truth, I shall argue, is that intent is never a
sufficient basis for imposing liability. Instead, liability is
always based on the "negligence" concept of
reasonableness. Since unreasonableness is presumed from
intent, proof of fault is never required. Rather, all
intentional torts actually impose a form of strict liability.
Unlike the anomalies mentioned above, these
observations cannot be casually dismissed; in fact, they
1 The scienter anomaly is discussed infra in Part III.B. 1 & 2.
2 The doctrine of transferred intent is addressed infra Part II.A. 1.
3 The mistake anomaly is analyzed infra Part III.A.2.
12
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could hardly be more important or timely. Obviously, all
jurisprudential regimes are expected to be both accurate
and comprehensible. However, the expectations for
intentional tort jurisprudence are even higher. Intentional
torts represent one-third of tort law's theoretical paradigm.
They are both defined by and distinguished from their
theoretical counterparts, negligence and strict liability.
Thus, if intentional tort jurisprudence contains any serious
conceptual flaws, they could not be easily isolated or neatly
cabined from the whole. Instead, they would threaten tort
law's entire supporting structure.
Today that structure is under review. In its mission to
restate tort law, the American Law Institute currently is
reconsidering all of the law's basic principles, including
those contained in the jurisprudence of intentional torts.4
Thus, if something is fundamentally wrong with that
jurisprudence, now would be the time to fix it. In fact, if
the flaws run as deep as I suspect, the time would be ripe to
shift the law toward a new theoretical paradigm.
5
4 The ALI's reanalysis is part of its ongoing project to develop a third
restatement of torts. To date, that project has gone through several
drafts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(Discussion Draft) (1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 2,2002). Sections 1
and 5 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) deal specifically with intentional
torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) §§ 1,5 (Tentative Draft No. 1,2001).
5 Thomas Kuhn first explained the notion of a scientific paradigm shift
in his groundbreaking book, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). In science, paradigms follow a
predictable pattern of thesis and antithesis. Someone discovers a
natural phenomenon, develops a hypothesis to explain the discovery
and initiates testing to determine if the hypothesis is accurate. If the
hypothesis withstands the rigors of empirical analysis, the scientist
declares the hypothesis to be "true." If that "truth" becomes generally
accepted, a paradigm on that subject is established.
13
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In the remainder of this article, I will show how the
many anomalies in intentional tort law create the need for
such a shift, and will suggest at least one option for change.
I will begin, in Part II, by examining the current theoretical
paradigm of tort law. This paradigm defines the avowed
interrelationship among intentional tort theory and the
theories of negligence and strict liability. In the next three
parts, I will show how these theoretical distinctions break
down in practice. Specifically, Part III demonstrates the
misfit between intentional tort theory and the cases falling
both within and beyond its reach. Part IV then reveals the
Other scientists invariably question this "truth" and subject it to
further testing. Not infrequently, the additional testing discloses
anomalies in the existing paradigm. If that paradigm cannot resolve
these anomalies, someone may offer a new hypothesis that does. See
id. at 84-85. If the new hypothesis explains the old anomalies without
creating any significant anomalies of its own, a new "truth" is
recognized, and a new paradigm is born. Id. at 17-18, 23.
Like science, jurisprudence is a truth-seeking discipline. As a
science of law, jurisprudence undertakes to uncover the principles and
values which underlie a body of legal rules and to accurately explain,
differentiate and classify them. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 854-55
(6'b ed. 1990). Theories which succeed in these tasks may acquire the
status of a legal paradigm. Over time, however, a legal paradigm may
cease to adequately explain the law's substance or structure, losing its
hold on the truth. It then stands vulnerable to replacement by a more
convincing theory.
A paradigm-legal or otherwise-cannot be eliminated unless
another stands ready to take its place, and a new paradigm cannot
commence without completely destroying its predecessor. As Thomas
Kuhn has noted, "[t]he decision to reject one paradigm is always
simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment
leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms
with nature and with each other." KUHN at 77.
The anomalies of intentional tort law seem to indicate that tort law
in general is nearing this point of eclipse. If so, we could not preserve
the law's integrity by making a few piecemeal changes. Instead, we
would have to completely alter the way we think about and analyze
liability issues. In short, we would have to shift toward a brand new
"postmodern" paradigm of tort law.
14
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overlap between intentional tort theory and the theory of
negligence. To round out this discussion, Part V uncovers
the remarkable and ironic affinities between intentional
torts and strict liability. Finally, in the Conclusion and
Proposal, I offer a new theoretical paradigm based on the
concept of reasonableness which not only captures the
spirit of intentional tort law, but also eliminates its most
enervating anomalies.
H. The Theoretical Paradigm of Tort Law
The prevailing theoretical paradigm of tort law,
depicted diagrammatically in Figure 1 below, divides all
torts into one of three theories of liability: intent,
negligence, or strict liability. Each theory is then classified
as either fault-based (negligent and intentional torts) or
fault-free (strict liability) and arranged along a fault
continuum. Intentional torts, which are extremely faulty,
fall at one end of this continuum. Negligent acts, which are
only moderately faulty, lie in the middle. Strict liability
activities, which are fault-free by definition, sit at the
opposite end of the continuum. 6
6 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. created the first version of this paradigm.
Holmes, too, placed all torts into three categories and arranged them
along a fault continuum. Clearly culpable torts-which were committed
with scienter-fell on one end of this continuum. See Oliver Wendell
Homes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, reprinted in I THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND
SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 327
(Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995)[hereinafter 1 WORKS]. Inculpable
torts--which were based on public policy-fell on the opposite end of
the continuum. See Id. Most negligence cases fell in the middle. See id.
at 327. All torts, however, were supposed to adhere to the same
objective, external standard. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., TIE
COMMON LAW 86-87 (1881)[hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON LAW].
Holmes' paradigm was not premised on the theories of intentional
tort, negligence and strict liability. According to Holmes, the clearly
culpable or scienter category of his paradigm covered both intentional
15
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Intentional torts and negligence make up the
paradigm's fault matrix. Within this matrix, fault has two
roles. Procedurally it is a unifier, requiring plaintiffs in
both negligence and intentional tort actions to prove their
offenders acted wrongfully. Substantively, however, fault
is a divider. It imposes different standards of liability for
negligence and intentional torts. Specifically, while
intentional torts are based on the subjective concept of
intent, negligence is based on an objective standard of
reasonable care.
At first, the fault matrix seems to require no
explanation. It has been around so long, and has been used
so widely, that it is simply taken for granted. Yet it is
neither as simple nor as straightforward as it may appear.
Within this matrix are a number of principles and
assumptions-some overt and familiar, others hidden or
overlooked-that impact the very structure and content of
contemporary tort law. Thus, before we can understand
intentional tort law, or begin to deconstruct it, we must first
take a closer look beneath its familiar surface.
Holmes' paradigm was not premised on the theories of
intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability. According
to Holmes, the clearly culpable, or scienter, category of his
paradigm covered both intentional torts and certain acts of
torts and certain acts of negligence. See 1 WORKS, supra, at 327. In
addition, inculpable torts were not restricted to "extrahazardous"
activities, but included as well some "mistaken" intentional torts. See
id. at 331.
Holmes' paradigm was misinterpreted and eventually modified by
his followers. For example, John Wigmore mistakenly read Holmes'
structured continuum as creating a tripartite division among intentional
torts, negligence and strict liability. See John H. Wigmore, The
Tripartite Division of Torts, 8 HARv. L. REV. 200,206(1894).
Wigmore's misinterpretation of Holmes was later adopted and spread
by Edwin Jaggard. See EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 48 (1895).
16
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negligence. In addition, inculpable torts were not only
restricted to "extrahazardous" activities, but also included
some "mistaken" intentional torts. Holmes' paradigm was
misinterpreted and eventually modified by his followers.
Most notably, John Wigmore, an admirer of Holmes,
mistakenly read Holmes' structured continuum as creating
a tripartite division among intentional torts, negligence, and
strict liability, a misinterpretation that was adopted and
spread by Edwin Jaggard.






A. The Form and Function of the Fault Matrix
The first principle of the fault matrix is to treat like
theories alike and different theories differently. By
separating negligence from intentional torts, the fault
matrix emphasizes the individuality and independence of
each theory of recovery. However, this line-drawing also
sends another, more subtle, message: the two theories
actually have different substantive bases. This message is
17
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reinforced by the concepts and terminology used to litigate
each action. In negligence cases, the defendant's conduct is
compared to an objective behavioral standard and evaluated
for reasonableness or unreasonableness. Conversely, in
intentional torts, the defendant's subjective mental state is
placed in question and is scrutinized for characteristics of
intentionality. These differences in perspectives and
standards are depicted in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: The Fault Element in Negligence and Intentional Torts
Negligence Intentional Torts
Perspective Objective Subjective
Standard Reasonable Care Intent
By these criteria, negligence and intentional torts
appear to be no more than distant cousins. However, even
a cursory review of these theories reveals far deeper ties.
Both intentional torts and negligence examine the extent of
the defendant's knowledge of risk. Negligence asks
whether the defendant knew or should have known of the
danger posed by his conduct, 7 while intentional torts ask
7 The "should have known" inquiry is really a question of
foreseeability. Foreseeability enters the negligence analysis in three
places: duty, breach and proximate causation. In the duty element,
forseeability is just one of several factors used to determine the scope
of a defendant's legal obligations. See J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924,
928 (N.J. 1998):
In determining whether a duty is to be imposed, courts
must engage in a rather complex analysis that weighs and
balances several, related factors, including the nature of
the underlying risk of harm, ... [specifically,] its
foreseeability and severity, the opportunity and ability to
exercise care to prevent the harm, the comparative
interests of, and the relationships between or among, the
parties, and, ultimately, based on considerations of public
18
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whether the defendant knew to a substantial certainty that
her act would produce a forbidden consequence.8
Additionally, both negligencis and intentional torts
assess the defendant's motives for acting and weigh the
benefits of that action against its attendant dangers.
Negligence balances motive, benefit, and risk in the
familiar B < P x L formula for determining breach. 9
Intentional torts weigh these factors in the analysis of
privilege, typically to measure the appropriateness of the
defendant's response to a provocative or threatening act or
condition. 10
In balancing these factors, both negligence and
intentional torts also attempt to determine whether the
policy and fairness, the societal interest in the proposed
solution.
Regarding the breach element, forseeability is part of the balancing
process which weighs the risks of action against the burdens of acting
differently. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 143-45 (2000)
(discussing the role of forseeability in the determination of breach).
For the causation element, forseeability is the test which determines
whether a negligent act is "proximate" enough to a resulting injury to
warrant holding the actor civilly liable. See Valcaniant v. Detroit
Edison Co., 679 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Mich. 2004) ("A defendant's breach
of duty is said to have proximately caused a plaintiffs injury only
where the defendant reasonably could have foreseen the kind of harm
that befell the plaintiff.").
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A(1965) (defining intent
to mean that "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that
he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it.").
9 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (developing and explaining this formula).
10 To establish a privilege, the defendant generally must prove that his
actions were reasonable under the circumstances. See infra text
accompanying notes 111-19. To prove that his actions were
reasonable, the defendant must show that his conduct was a well-
measured response to the risks at hand; or stated differently, that he
could not act in a less risky fashion without incurring an undue burden
to his own interests.
19
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defendant's own risk-benefit judgment comports with
society's objective standard of reasonableness. Negligence
employs its objective standard overtly in the breach
element, 1 while intentional torts sneak the reasonableness
analysis in through the back door, usually in the guise of a
privilege or defense. 12 Although these issues may arise in
different ways, their appearance in both theories suggests
that there are more similarities here than meets the eye.
Finally, the fault-based torts bear certain structural
affinities. For example, in both negligence and intentional
torts, the fault issue is binary--meaning, it depends not just
on the nature of the defendant's act, but also on the nature
of the consequences its brings about. In negligence, it is
not enough that someone behaves in a careless manner. To
be found liable for his negligence, the actor must also cause
some harm to an unwitting victim. 13 The same holds true
for intentional torts. No one is held liable simply for
thinking bad thoughts or even for acting with improper
motives; to commit an intentional tort, the actor must also
bring about a consequence forbidden by law.
14
In both theories, the relationship between act and injury
is governed by a principle of inverse proportionality. The
more blameworthy the act, the less serious the injury needs
to be for the offense to be considered wrongful.
Conversely, the less culpable the act, the more egregious
the harm must be to hold the actor liable. Negligent acts,
for example, carry only a moderate degree of culpability.
Thus, they are actionable only if they cause some actual
damage. 15 Intentional torts, because of their willfulness,
11 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 269-70,275,280.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 111-19.
13 See DOBBS,supra note 7, at 269.
14 The consequence need not result in an actual injury. It is enough if
it produces a dignitary invasion, like the offensive touching of battery,
which is prohibited by a specific intentional tort. Id. at 79-80.
15 Id. at 271.
20
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usually carry a very high degree of culpability. As a result,
they normally do not require proof of actual injury. 
16
There are exceptions, however. Where an intentional
act falls lower on the scale of opprobrium, the harm
requirement increases in kind. This is true of most property
torts. Because property interests are less valuable than
interests in mental tranquility and bodily integrity, trespass
to chattels rates as a rather trivial infraction. Thus, it is not
deemed faulty unless it inflicts upon its victim some
measure of actual financial damage. 
17
B. Seeing Beyond the Matrix
Beyond these visible features, the fault matrix contains
other characteristics that are much harder to spot. These de
facto features, though unexplained and underappreciated,
are no less important to the structure and content of tort
law. Indeed, they may have even more influence over
issues of fault and liability than all of the visible features
combined.
On the fault issue, the matrix says that negligence and
intentional torts create substantive reasons for holding
someone liable. However, these reasons are not, in
themselves, definitive. Invariably, they can be met with
affirmative defenses. These defenses explain or justify the
questioned conduct, or they point to other possible causes
of the victims' harm.
Ideally, defenses should have as great a role in defining
a particular liability regime as the theories of fault they
combat For example, a fault theory that permitted no
16 Id. at 79-80. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS 37 (5 th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER] (discussing
the "irregular and poorly defined sliding scale" that ranges from
intentional torts, which carry extensive liabilities, to inadvertent acts,
which do not).
17 See DOBBS,supra note 7, at 122, 124.
21
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defenses at all would look a lot like strict liability. 18 By the
same token, a theory that allowed an endless number of
easy defenses would create virtual immunity. 19 Either way,
the fault analysis would be skewed. In the first scenario,
the analysis would be incomplete because it would prevent
even a faultless defendant from demonstrating the
reasonableness of his actions. In the second scenario, it
would be misleading since it might allow even a
blameworthy defendant to escape liability on grounds of
public policy.
Unfortunately, tort law's theoretical paradigm neither
acknowledges the nexus between theory and defense nor
assesses the impact this nexus may have on the law's
substantive personality. Instead, tort law's theoretical
paradigm simply defines all torts by the theories used to
describe them and assumes these theories remain true to
their substantive descriptions, regardless of the number of
defenses allowed or the grounds on which they are
proffered.
The theoretical side of this duality harbors secrets of its
own Each theory within the fault matrix consists of several
predetermined elements of proof. Negligence always
consists of four substantive elements: (1) the existence of a
duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) damage; and (4) a
18 Id. at 331-32 (noting that jurisdictions which refuse to permit
defenses in negligenceper se actions effectively impose strict liability).
19 For example, a landowner sued for negligence by a trespasser may
escape liability by arguing, among other things, that he did not create
the danger which caused the trespasser harm, did not willfully harm the
trespasser, or did not know of the trespasser's presence on his property.
He may also argue that he gave adequate warning of the danger on his
property, that the danger was open and obvious, or that the trespasser
assumed the risk of injury. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Tort
Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE
L.J. 144 (1953) (surveying the limited duties owed by landowners to
trespassers).
22
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causal connection between the damage and the breach. 20
The elements of intentional torts, however, vary by theory.
For example, battery requires proof that an actor
intentionally inflicted a harmful or offensive contact upon
another. 2 1 False imprisonment, on the other hand, occurs
when someone intentionally and unlawfully places another
under confinement or restraint 22 On a surface level, these
elements seem quite different. In reality, however, they are
very much alike. In fact, all fault-based torts share a
similar substantive structure, and that structure always
serves the same normative functions.
Because these structural commonalities are not openly
acknowledged, seeing them requires a good bit of
extrapolation and synthesis. The elements of negligence
can be distilled down to the familiar litany of duty, breach,
causation, and damage. 23 While intentional torts as a whole
do not share the same elements of proof, they do seem to
display the same elemental structure. Generally speaking,
to establish any intentional tort, the plaintiff must prove
that (1) the defendant committed an act; (2) with an illicit
intent; and (3) caused him to suffer a wrongful
consequence. In short, he must establish act, intent,
causation and consequence.24
Comparing this elemental structure to the structure for
negligence, three common elements emerge. First, both
require a duty violation or, stated differently, the breach of
a standard or rule which prohibits or prescribes that
activity. For negligence, the duty violation is contained in
the elements of duty and breach. For intentional torts, it
arises from the elements of act and intent, with the intent
element carrying an implicit duty to refrain from willing
20 See DOBBS,supra note 7, at §§ 114, 115.
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
22 Id. at § 35.
23 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 269-73.
24 See ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 166 (1997).
23
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25certain forbidden consequences. Second, both require
that the plaintiff sustain some harm, either actual or
presumed.26 As noted earlier, negligence routinely
demands proof of actual harm or damage. While only some
intentional torts contain an actual harm requirement, the
remainder readily presume harm from particular acts, like
touching another in an offensive manner or treading across
his property. Third, both theories require some causal
connection between the duty violated and the harm
claimed .
Despite their prominence, these obvious elements do not
complete the law's structural profile. Neither negligence
nor intentional torts impose absolute liability. Rather, both
place various limits on the defendant's responsibility.
Negligence's limits appear in the elements of duty and
causation. Duty limits exist for special types of actors and
special types of harn 28 and can be grounded in either
fairness or public policy. 29 Causation is limited by the
concept of proximate cause, which excludes harmful effects
that are highly extraordinary or too remote. 30 Intentional
tort limits are fewer in number, narrower in scope, and
harder to find, but they do exist. Most often, they appear in
the causation element, when the intentional act is diluted by
time and space, or overpowered by intervening forces.
3'
25 Id. at 166-67.
26 Id. at 132.
27 Id. at 135.
28 Actors receiving limited duties include owners and occupiers of land
and public entities. See DOBBS,supra note 7, chs. 13, 15. The harms
receiving limited duties include emotional distress, wrongful birth and
pure economic loss. See JoHN L. DIAMOND ET AL, UNDERSTANDING
TORTS §§ 10.01, 10.02, 10.04 (2000).
29 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at §§ 229, 230.
30 Id. at §§ 180, 181.
31 Id. at 120 ("[L]iability for trespass would not extend to indirect
injuries that were also unintended and unforeseeable").
200
24
ANOMALIES IN INTENTIONAL TORT LAW
However, they also can be found in the intent element, as
intentions become distanced from their effects.
32
Because both negligence and intentional torts recognize
restrictions on liability, one must add a limitation element
to the list of common features. With this fourth element in
place, the internal structure of the fault matrix takes final
form. To analyze any case for tortious fault, one must, at a
minimum, consider the issues of duty limitation, duty
violation, causation, and harm. 33 These structural elements,
and their counterparts under the fault matrix, are depicted
in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Elements of Negligence and Intentional Torts; Common Elements of
Fault-Based Torts
Negligence Intentional Torts Common
Elements
Duty/Limits Act Limitations




Although these elements are not openly acknowledged,
they have not come together by accident. Each element
serves a very specific purpose, and all elements work in
unison to achieve a greater objective. 34 The responsibility
and limitation elements establish the defendant's duty of
care; the harm element establishes the plaintiff's right of
32 Id. at 77 (explaining that the doctrine of transferred intent or
extended liability "may well be limited to cases of conscious
wrongdoing and to those in which harm... results directly from an
intended intervention.").
33 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT
LAW 2-3 (2d ed. 2002) (recognizing all but the limitation element).
34 The moral and political dynamic of these elements is explained more
fully in my book JUSTICE AND TORT LAW, supra note 24, at 121-23.
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redress; and the causation element links the defendant's
duty to the plaintiffs right, establishing both the
defendant's liability and the plaintiff's power to enforce it.
In the end, each unique element defines a new theory of
fault. Conventional wisdom holds that fault-based torts are
harder to prove than strict liability. This conclusion is
premised on the fact that both negligence and intentional
torts have a duty-based culpability element, while strict
liability does not. However, the presence or absence of a
culpability element does not necessarily determine a tort's
substantive identity. Rather, its identity is defined by the
overall concatenation of its conceptual elements.
This truth is no more apparent than in the theory of
strict liability itself. In some cases, strict liability imposes
requirements that fault-based torts do not. For example, the
theory of respondeat superior requires the plaintiff to prove
both that the defendant's employee was at fault and that the
employee was acting within the scope of employment. 35 In
other cases, strict liability makes a one-for-one swap,
replacing the fault requirement with another that is equally
difficult to satisfy. For instance, the theory of strict
products liability trades the issue of manufacturer fault for
a complex and burdensome calculus of product
defectiveness. 36 In each situation, the strict liability label
says one thing, but the elemental structure of the tort
suggests something almost entirely different.
Even in fault-based theories, the fault element does not
always provide a reliable description of the underlying tort.
Duties may be onerous or relaxed.37 Limitations upon duty
35 See DOBBS,supra note 7, at 906.
36 Id. at 980-81, 985-87.
37 Id. at 581. Negligence law recognizes heightened duties in a variety
of fields. See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharm., Inc., 880
P.2d 1129, 1132-33 (Ariz. 1994) (professionals acting in their area of
expertise).
For example, product manufacturers are expected to be "experts"
202
26
ANOMALIES IN INTENTIONAL TORT LAW
in their fields. See O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir.
1967) ("A manufacturer is held to the skill of an expert in its particular
field of endeavor, and is obligated to keep informed of scientific
knowledge and discoveries concerning that field."); Guffie v. Erie
Strayer Co., 350 F.2d 378, 381 (3rd Cir. 1965) ("While a manufacturer
is not required to be clairvoyant he is rightly held to the standard of an
expert in regard to his own product."); Lopez v. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co., 546 So. 2d 291,294 (La. Ct. App. 1989) ("The standard of
knowledge, skill, and care in regard to the failure to use alternative
products or designs is that of an expert, including the duty to test,
inspect, research, and experiment commensurate with the danger.");
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974) (holding
a drug manufacturer to an expert standard).
Although innkeepers normally owe their guests "a high degree of
care," Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 410 So. 2d 1048, 1053 (La.
1982), in some cases they bear "the highest standard of care-strict
liability-for the safekeeping of the personal property of a guest."
Cook v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 807 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991). Likewise, common carriers must exercise "the utmost care"
toward their passengers. See Rozmajzl v. Northland Greyhound Lines
et al., 49 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1951) (noting that the common
carrier's duty extends "as far as human care and foresight will go.");
Nelson v. Flathead Valley Transit, 824 P.2d 263 (Mont. 1992) (holding
that a common carrier must exercise the utmost care and diligence in
the care of its passengers); Markwell v. Whinery's Real Estate, Inc. 869
P.2d 840, 845 (Okla. 1994) (adopting an utmost care standard).
Finally, adults who deal with children must use "extraordinary care" to
protect "infants too young to take care of themselves." Crosswhite v.
Shelby Operating Corp., 30 S.E.2d 673, 674 (Va. 1944).
Heightened standards also apply to people engaged in hazardous
activities, imposing an added degree of responsibility for every degree
of risk the defendant creates. See Winfrey v. Rocket Research Co., 794
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he amount of care
necessary varies with the danger which is incurred by negligence, for a
prudent and reasonable man increases his care with the increase of
danger."). See also Halliburton v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 804 P.2d
213, 215-16 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (manufacturers and sellers of natural
gas held to higher duty of care); Waters v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 212 So. 2d 487, 490 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (holding those who
handle gasoline to "a very high duty of care"); Kuhns v. Brugger, 135
A.2d 395, 400 (Pa. 1957) (one who carries a loaded weapon "is bound
to exercise extraordinary care"); Winfrey, 794 P.2d at 1303 (those who
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may be numerous or few.3 8 Standards of persuasion may
be robust or trivial.39 Without considering these additional
maintain high voltage equipment "must exercise the highest degree of
care to avoid injuries"). Indeed, anyone who uses "substances or
instrumentalities" that "might endanger persons or property [is] held to
a high degree or an extraordinary degree of care." Waters, 212 So. 2d at
490.
On the other end of the spectrum, relaxed standards emerge in a
number of places. Landowners often owe trespassers only the duty to
avoid willful or wanton injury. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 592.
Unless engaged in adult activities, children are expected only to behave
like a reasonable child of like age, intelligence and experience. Id. at
293. Additionally, all people thrust into emergencies "may conduct
themselves ... in ways that would not be reasonable if time permitted
more thoughtful decision-making." Id. at 304.
38 Early negligence law was replete with duty limitations and
immunities, but since the latter half of the nineteenth century these
obstacles have steadily fallen. Gone are the charitable, spousal,
parental and sovereign immunities. See id. at 695, 716, 752, 754-55,
763. Gone, too, are privity limitations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (2)(b) (1965) (products liability applies even though
"the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller."); but see H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928) (upholding the privity
limitation). See also DOBBS, supra note 11, at 803-04 (limits on
recoery for wrongful death); id. at 836 (emotional distress). The
entrant classification system of premises liability is in decline. See id.
at 615-16, 619-20. Even proximate cause limits such as unforeseeable
consequences and superseding cause are in jeopardy of extinction. See
Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative
Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53
S.C. L. Rzv. 1103 (2002) (noting that comparative fault has brought
about a decrease in superseding cause arguments cutting off
defendants' responsibility).
In each case, the defunct or near-defunct rule has been replaced or
eroded by the more flexible concept of foreseeability. Unlike duty
rules, foreseeability knows no temporal bounds, protecting people
months or years after the commission of a tortious act. See Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (drug manufacturer held liable
to the daughter of a consumer who ingested plaintiff's drug decades
earlier); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University o fCalifomia, 551 P.2d
334 (Cal. 1976) (holding a psychologist liable for a murder committed
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two months after his last consultation with the perpetrator).
Foreseeability is also unlimited by space, protecting people in the most
distant and remote places. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338
F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding transit company liable for damage to a
bridge nearly three miles downstream from where it improperly moored
a ship); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354 (1874)
(holding railroad liable for fire damage to a barn four miles away from
where the railroad started the fire). Furthermore, forseeability is
unlimited by theory, protecting victims of both negligence and of strict
liability activities. See Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15-16
(Md. 1975) (applying a forseeability analysis in a strict products
liability case); Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 925 (Wash.
1991), amended, 817 P.2d 1359 (Wash. 1991) (applying a forseeability
analysis in an abnormally dangerous activity claim).
Although applications of forseeability vary, its range does not - it
can stretch as far as justice or policy requires. In the words of one
court, "there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee
forever...." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989). On
such days, the duties of negligence law can reach the limits of strict
liability and even go beyond.
39 To obtain punitive damages or state a case of fraud, the plaintiff
generally must present clear and convincing evidence. See Linthicum
v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986) (punitive
damages); Marriage of Cutler, 588 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 1999)
(fraud). In some situations, however, plaintiffs can prevail with little or
no proof of fault, relying instead on presumptions created by the court.
See Cofield v. Burgdorf, 115 So. 2d 357, 358 (La. 1959) (recognizing a
"presumption that where one is in the possession of... a vehicle of
another and is using it in the service of such other, he is the servant or
agent of the owner."); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stroh, 550 A.2d
373, 375 (Md. 1988) ("[W]here an automobile owner-passenger grants
permission to another to drive his car, and the permissive operator
drives negligently, the owner has presumptively consented to the
negligence."); Tidewater Stevedore Co. v. Lindsay, 116 S.E. 377, 380
(Va. 1923) (recognizing a presumption of negligence where a bailee
retumed property in damaged condition). Other times, courts aid
plaintiffs by shifting burdens of proof to defendants. See Sindell v.
Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (shifting the burden of
proof in a market share liability case); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5
(Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden of proof in an alternative liability
case); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (shifting the
burden of proof in a negligenceper se action).
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factors, one simply cannot tell whether a given theory is
lenient or strict, or is fault-heavy or fault-light.
Such uncertainty derives not just from an over-reliance
on substance, but also from an underestimation of
procedure. In the modem paradigm, plaintiffs generally
must prove the substantive elements of the theories they
wish to raise. Sometimes, however, courts shift part of this
burden to defendants. For example, in cases of negligence
per se, proof of a statutory violation often creates a
presumption of negligence. This presumption forces the
defendant to produce evidence excusing or justifying the
violation.4° Likewise, a prima facie showing of res ipsa
loquitur typically compels the defendant to prove that her
conduct was not unreasonable.4'
Each theory is classified as negligence because it
contains the requisite culpability element. However, both
negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur are markedly
different from the average negligence claim. Although
duty and breach still appear as elements of proof, plaintiffs
can satisfy these elements with little or no effort. For
negligence per se, the plaintiff must merely produce facts
indicating that the defendant's actions were inconsistent
42with the literal terms of a statute. For res ipsa, he need
only present the facts surrounding his accident-facts
which "speak for themselves" in pointing the finger of
40 See Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976) (creating
a rebuttable presumption in a negligenceper se action).
41 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 377 ("It is possible to imagine that the
plaintiff's evidence creates an inference so strong that, unless the
evidence is simply not credited, it should carry the case for the plaintiff
in the absence of rebuttal."). In some jurisdictions, res ipsa evidence
creates a presumption of fault, while in others it shifts to the defendant
the burden of disproving his fault. See Sullivan v. Crabtree, 258
S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (describing these approaches).
42 Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant violated
an applicable statute, regulation or ordinance, and (2) that violation
caused the plaintiff's harm. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 315-16.
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blame at the defendant. 4 In each case, the plaintiff does
not prove fault; rather, fault is presumed from proof of just
a few facts.
In this way, such "negligence" actions bear a striking
resemblance to the theory of strict liability. Granted, they
may not purge fault references like strict liability, but
neither do they frame fault issues like other fault-based
torts. If anything, they seem to create a category all their
own At the very least, they strongly suggest that the
substantive identity of any theory may be based less on
what elements it contains and more on how those elements
are allocated between the parties.
III. Unintentional and Unrecognized Intentional Torts
With the current paradigm's principles and assumptions
laid bare, it is easier to find its flaws, including those
infecting the jurisprudence of intentional tort law. Here,
the problems begin with the concept of intent itself.
Indeed, as I shall demonstrate below, the conventional view
of intent is both over- and under-inclusive. It is over-
inclusive because many "intentional" torts are not
intentional at all. In cases of transferred intent and mistake,
the defendant either lacks the intent to harm the plaintiff or
43 Res ipsa loquitur requires proof ofjust three facts: (1) there was an
accident, (2) the accident normally would not happen without
negligence, and (3) the defendant controlled the instrumentality that
brought it about. See Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 188 P.2d 513, 514
(Cal. Ct. App. 1948). When all three facts are present, they create a
presumptive inference of fault--sometimes an inference so powerful it
precludes any other conclusion. See Imig v. Beck, 503 N.E.2d 324,
329-30 (Ill. 1986) ("[I]n exceptional cases the plaintiff may be entitled
either to a directed verdict or to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
because the unrebuttedprimafacie proof of negligence is so strong that
all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the
defendant, so overwhelmingly favors the plaintiff that no contrary jury
verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.").
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his intent is completely innocent, yet he is labeled as an
intentional tortfeasor nonetheless. These are, in effect,
unintentional intentional torts. Tortious intent also is
under-inclusive because some actions that are intentional
simply are not classified as such. For example, conduct
performed with knowledge of its harmful effects is by
definition intentional, yet it often is covered by other
theories like negligence or strict liability. These are really
unrecognized intentional torts.
A. Unintentional Intentional Torts
Tort law defines intent in two ways: as a desire or
purpose,44 and as knowledge that something is substantially
certain to occur.45 To be intentional, the desire or
knowledge must be linked to a specific consequence. 46 To
be actionable, that consequence must be wrongful. If the
actor brings about a consequence different from the one he
had in mind, his conduct may be wrongful but not
intentional. If the actor intends a lawful consequence, his
conduct is not wrongful at all, even if it causes serious
harm.
Modem intentional tort law fails to grasp these truths.
Under the doctrine of transferred intent, it classifies as
intentional any conduct which lacks a specific intent to
harm. In cases of mistake, it treats as intentional even
conduct which lacks a wrongful intent. If such conduct is
ill-considered or irresponsible, there may be good reasons
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § l(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1,2001)
(purpose); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (desire).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § l(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1,2001);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1965) ("'Intent'...
has reference to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself.").
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for holding the perpetrators liable. But those reasons,
whatever they may be, are not adequately explained or
openly acknowledged by the current theory of intentional
torts.
1. Transferred Intent: No Intent to Commit the
Resulting Wrong
Transferred intent is a legal fiction. Generally
speaking, it applies when an act intended to wrong one
person winds up harming another.47 In these situations, the
actor does not plan or even desire to harm the actual victim,
nor does he know to a substantial certainty the victim will
be injured by his conduct. Indeed, he may not even know
the victim is present. Without a desire, plan or knowledge
the offending act cannot be considered intentional - at least
not in relation to the actual victim. In fact, from the actor's
standpoint, any impact her act may have on the victim is
purely accidental.
Nevertheless, transferred intent treats the actor as if he
were an intentional tortfeasor. It transfers the actor's intent
from one party to another-specifically, from the
"intended" victim to the "actual," unexpected victim. In
doing so, it does not simply switch one culpable mental
state for another; rather, it creates a mental state the actor
47 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 75-76. Professor Dobbs describes
transferred intent as a type of "extended liability." Id. at 75. Besides
the mistaken victim scenario noted in the text, extended liability applies
in two other scenarios. In one, the defendant intends to offend the
victim, but harm results. Id. In the other, the defendant intends to
commit one tort, but a different tort results. Id. at 76. In this latter
scenario, however, the resulting tort may actually define its intent in a
way such that encompasses the intent to commit the original tort. For
example, the RESTATEMENT SECOND defines battery to include the
intent to assault, and defines assault to include the intent to the batter.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 21 (1965). Thus, no
"transfer" of intent between these torts is required.
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did not actually possess and connects it to someone he did
not actually seek to injure.
This does not mean that transferred intent always
reaches the wrong conclusions. It merely means that it
reaches its conclusions in the wrong way. There certainly
are situations where an actor should be held liable for the
consequences of a deliberative, though unintentional, act.
For example, if the harm the actor causes is the same as the
harm she intends, she deserves the same amount of blame
even if that harm is suffered by a person she did not expect
to injure.48 Here, the actor really does have the intent to
commit the resulting tort, at least in a general and
unspecified sense. Although the victim is different, the
wrong is not Thus, it is fair to hold the tortfeasor
accountable. However, it does not make sense to say that
he intentionally injured the actual victim. It makes more
sense to say that he engaged in a suspect act that required
him to act at his peril.49
The case of Talmage v. Smith5° illustrates the point. In
Talmage, several boys climbed atop the roof of the
defendant's shed. The defendant ordered the boys to get
down, but they refused. The defendant retrieved a stick and
threw it at one of the boys. The stick struck the plaintiff,
who was standing on the opposite side of the roof. The
plaintiff sued the defendant for battery. At trial, the
defendant testified that he could not see the plaintiff anid
did not know he was there. The trial judge instructed the
jury on transferred intent, stating that the defendant's intent
48 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 77 ("[T]he doctrine [of transferred
intent] may well be limited to cases of conscious wrongdoing and to
those in which harm ...results directly from an intended intervention.").
49 Professor Vincent Johnson reached the same conclusion, but
recommended that such cases be handled as accidents, and not as cases
of act-at-peril liability. See Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in
American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 903,937 (2004).
50 59 N.W. 656 (Mich. 1894).
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to commit battery against one boy could be applied to the
battery against the plaintiff. Guided by this instruction, the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the verdict and the
instructions which supported it, noting that "[t]he right of
the plaintiff to recover was made to depend upon an
intention on the part of the defendant to hit somebody, and
to inflict an unwarranted injury upon someone.''
Talmage reached the right result but did so for the
wrong reason. The defendant clearly did not intend to
strike the plaintiff; indeed, the facts proved he was not even
aware the plaintiff was on the roof. However, the facts also
depicted a man out of control. By picking up the stick, the
defendant armed himself with a potentially dangerous
weapon. By hurling that weapon in the direction of several
young boys, he created a high probability that one of them
would be seriously injured. Since the defendant himself
was not threatened, his chosen response was both
unjustified and inexcusable, even if it was not directed at
any particular boy. Under these circumstances, the
defendant should have been held accountable for the
consequences of his act, just not as an intentional
tortfeasor.
This take on Talmage might be different if the
defendant's intended tort was not the tort inflicted-say, if
the defendant had attempted to strike the plaintiff s house
but struck the plaintiff instead. In that case the resulting
harm would not match the one expected or desired.
Because the harm in fact would transcend the harm in
mind, the outcome itself would be unintentional. Even if
the act was deliberate, the consequence would be purely
unplanned. Indeed, the harm would proceed notfrom the
actor's will, but in spite of it. To transfer intent under these
circumstances would be to concoct an intent that never
"' Id. at 657.
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actually existed.
This disjunction between intent and consequence could
occur in two types of cases. In one, the defendant brings
about the same general kind of harm as the type he
originally intended-say, a harm to another person-but
the actual injury far exceeds his reasonable expectations.
Such was the case in Brown v. Martinez.52 In Brown,
three boys entered the defendant's property for the purpose
of stealing some watermelons. After the defendant warned
the boys to leave, they started to run from the southeast to
the southwest corner of the property. To scare the boys, the
defendant fired his rifle into the southeast corner, away
from where they were running. Unexpectedly, the
defendant's bullet struck the plaintiff in the leg. Although
the defendant had no intent to harm the boys, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held him liable for an intentional
tort.
The Brown court based its decision on the concept of
transferred intent. By firing his rifle, the defendant had
attempted to commit an assault. 53 The court linked this
relatively benign intent to the boy's more serious injury,
thereby manufacturing a case of battery. In doing so,
however, the court did not merely transfer the defendant's
intent from one person to another, it changed the very
nature of the defendant's act. In effect, it changed a
reckless act into a purposeful event.
The second type of disjunction between intent and
consequence produces even more disturbing results. It
arises when an actor intends to cause one type of harm-
like property damage-but actually inflicts a completely
different, and far more serious, type of harm-like physical
injury to a person.
This was the case in Corn v. Sheppard. 54 In that case,
52 361 P.2d 152 (N.M. 1961).
53Id. at 159-60.
5 229 N.W. 869 (Minn. 1930).
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the defendant-homeowner fired a revolver at some dogs
congregating near his garage. Unbeknownst to the
defendant, the plaintiff was standing nearby. The
defendant's bullet missed the dogs and struck the plaintiff
in the arm and abdomen. As in Brown, the defendant here
harbored no intent to harm In fact, he had no intent to
even threaten another human being. His only purpose was
to disperse a pack of dogs. Nevertheless, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held him liable for the plaintiff's loss.
Although the court did not employ the term "transferred
intent," it clearly applied the same concept.55 The
defendant had intended to commit a trespass to chattels.
By chance, he actually inflicted a battery upon the plaintiff.
This mismatch of intent and consequence was of no
moment to the court, which noted: "Where a person
intentionally discharges a firearm for a wrongful purpose
and another is hit, he is liable for the injuries inflicted,
although he did not intend to hit the other nor even know
that any person was within range."
56
If this is what is meant by tortious intent, however, that
concept has little meaning. Corn presents a classic mishap.
Through a stroke of bad luck, an ill-advised act turned into
an awful nightmare. No matter what label one uses to
describe this incident, it certainly was neither planned nor
predicted; and the harm, though unfortunate, was clearly
neither comparable to nor commensurate with the result
intended.
This is not to say the homeowner was completely
55 Specifically, the Court held the defendant strictly liable for using a
dangerous instrumentality-in this case, a firearm. Id. at 870-71. This
aspect of Corn is addressed more fully below. See infra text
accompanying notes 57-60. The concepts of transferred intent and
strict liability are so similar that Prosser's casebook includes the Corn
case in its coverage of transferred intent. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET
AL, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 29 ( 1 0 th ed. 2000).56 Corn, 229 N.W. at 871.
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innocent or should escape all liability. If she suspected
people were present, she should be adjudged reckless for
firing in their direction. If he could have dispersed the dogs
in a safer manner, he should be found negligent for firing
the gun at all. The goal is not to find a way to fit these
cases into the unreceptive theory of intentional tort, but
rather to find the right theory for each set of facts.
Interestingly, the Corn court did just that. Rather than
dwelling on the defendant's intent, the court focused on his
activity-firing a gun. The court deemed guns "dangerous
instrumentalities, 57 and found that discharging them is an
abnormally dangerous activity. Such activities are
presumptively unreasonable and should be undertaken only
rarely and with great caution. As the Court observed,
[W]here a person has a gun in his hands and it is
discharged, even accidentally and
unintentionally, he is held liable for the injuries
caused thereby, unless he shows that he took all
reasonable precautions to guard against
accidents, and that the discharge of the weapon
did not result from any careless act on his part.58
The defendant in Corn, however, had failed to carry
this burden. He could not show either that he needed to fire
his gun or that he took to "all reasonable precautions"
before doing so.59 Because his decision was deliberate, his
act dangerous, and his purpose illegal, he was responsible
for any harm that resulted from his conduct. The fact that
"he did not intend to hit [the plaintiff] or even know that
any person was within range" was no excuse. 60Ultimately, the defendant's liability was based on the
57 Id. at 870.
58id.
59 id.
60 Id. at 87 1.
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principle that one who intentionally fires a weapon acts at
his own peril. This principle has a name, but it is not
intentional tort; it is strict liability, or at least something
very closely akin to it. Stripped of its "intentional" fagade,
transferred intent is, in the parlance of the current
theoretical paradigm, really a no-fault concept. 61 It
imposes liability irrespective of knowledge or purpose and
shifts to the defendant the burden of exculpation. Later on,
I shall argue that all intentional torts impose a form of strict
liability, even without the doctrine of transferred intent.
For now, it is enough to see that the intentional tort
moniker is not always appropriate, and in many instances,
may seriously obscure the true basis of liability.
2. Mistake: No Intent to Commit Any Wrong
A mistake occurs when an actor acts upon
misinformation. In some cases the actor may be mistaken
about the facts, and in others he may be mistaken about the
law. Under the current paradigm, neither type of mistake is
a saving grace. Because a mistaken act proceeds from a
deliberate choice, the mistaken actor is considered an
intentional tortfeasor and is liable for all of the unexpected
consequences that flow from his conduct. 62
In a mistake of fact, the actor does not realize who or
what he is acting upon. These are cases of mistaken
identity. For example, in Ranson v. Kitner,63 some hunters
shot and killed a dog they believed to be a wolf. The
61 In his discussion of transferred intent, Professor Dobbs notes that
"[i]t is possible to think of liability in excess of moral fault as a species
of strict or absolute liability." See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 78 n.2.
62 See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 110 ("[I]f one intentionally interferes
with the interests of others, he is often subject to liability
notwithstanding the invasion was made under an erroneous belief as to
some fact or legal matter that would have justified the conduct.").
" 31111. App. 241 (1889).
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plaintiff sued for the value of his dog. 64 Judgment was
entered for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed. In
affirming the judgment, the Appellate Court of Illinois
concluded that the defendants "are clearly liable for the
damages caused by their mistake, notwithstanding they
were acting in good faith.",
65
In a mistake of law, the actor misunderstands his own
rights or the rights of others. These are cases of mistaken
ownership. For instance, in Perry v. Jefferies,66 the
defendant removed timber from land he believed to be his
own. The property, in fact, belonged to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff alleged trespass, and a jury agreed. On appeal, the
defendant argued his mistake should negate his liability.
Unpersuaded, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
affirmed the judgment, reasoning that it would not be
"sound law that a mistaken belief as to ownership in a
trespasser will entitle him to go unharmed by the law for an
actual invasion of the property rights of another."
67
According to the Court, "[w]hen the title and right of
possession of land is in one man, any other man must at his
peril invade such lands, no matter what he honestly
believes.
' 68
In mistakes of law or fact, the mistaken defendant is
held liable for an intentional tort even though the criteria
for intent are conspicuously absent. The hunters who
intended to shoot a wild animal did not desire to harm
anyone's property, nor did they know to a substantial
certainty they were about to do so. Likewise, the
landowner who believed he was on his own property
clearly had no designs on the land of his neighbor. Perhaps
64 The plaintiff presumably asserted the intentional tort of conversion,
but the case report does not disclose the plaintiff's theory of recovery.
65 Ranson, 3 1111. App. at 241.
66 39 S.E. 515 (S.C. 1901).
67 Id. at 523.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
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one could condemn these defendants for acting without
adequate information. If so, their sin would be rashness,
not harboring a tortious intent to harm.
Besides mischaracterizing certain unintentional acts, the
mistake doctrine also produces inconsistent results. If
intent truly were unaffected by a mistake of fact or law,
then every mistaken intentional act should be actionable.
Yet this is not the case. In certain scenarios, such mistakes
are readily excused.
In Smith v. Delery,69 for example, the defendant-
landowner shot the plaintiff-newspaper boy under a
mistaken belief the plaintiff was a prowler. Instead of
holding the defendant liable for battery, the Louisiana
Supreme Court dismissed the action against him. The
Court explained that, notwithstanding the defendant's
intent, he "had acted as a reasonable and prudent man in the
belief that he and his family were in immediate danger."
70
A similar result was reached in Boyer v. Waples.7 In
Boyer, the defendant shot the plaintiffs because he
mistakenly believed they carried dynamite which they
intended to use to blow up his house. Although the
defendant clearly possessed the intent to fire at the
plaintiffs, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs' battery
claim. The California District Court of Appeals affirmed,
noting that "the defendant justifiably acted in defense of his
family and his home and ... the force employed by him was
not excessive. 72
The most surprising thing about these mistake cases is
not that intentional tort law treats them so inconsistently,
but that the law is so consistently incorrect in its descriptive
analysis. In cases such as Ranson and Perry, defendants are
held liable for an intentional tort even though they do not
69 114 So.2d 857 (La. 1959).
70 Id. at 859.
7 24 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
72 Id. at 194.
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actually intend to wrong anyone. Instead, they are subject
to the strict liability principle that a man acts at his peril. In
cases such as Smith and Boyer, defendants who intend to
harm someone nevertheless get off scot-free. Here,
salvation comes in the form of "negligence" concepts like
"justifiability" and "prudence."
In reality, these mistake scenarios are not as
contradictory and irrational as they first appear. As I will
demonstrate below, they are easily explained by the
pervasive ethic of reasonableness. The confusion comes in
attempting to stuff round pegs (unintentional torts) into
square holes (intent-based theories).
B. Unrecognized Intentional Torts
Transferred intent and mistake present errors of over-
inclusion. That is, they characterize some acts as
intentional, when they really are not. Other times,
however, intentional tort law commits errors of under-
inclusion. In these situations, the law fails to apply the
intent moniker to acts which really are intentional, at least
under the definition used in the current paradigm.
1. The Scienter Conundrum
The under-inclusion problem arises most often in
scienter cases. Here, the defendant does not desire to cause
harm but still knows to a substantial certainty that harm
will result from his act. This knowledge--or scienter-is
tantamount to tortious intent, even though it does not carry
the same connotation in everyday usage.
Like the purposeful form of intent, scienter is a
subjective concept. This concept knows virtually no
external boundaries. It is circumscribed by only two
things: epistemology and statistical probability. If an actor
actually knows that harm is a virtually inevitable
42
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consequence of his conduct, his conduct should be deemed
intentional, no matter how far it might reach or how many
people it might injure. In practice, however, courts rarely
interpret scienter so broadly. Rather, they tend to construe
it quite narrowly. Such pigeonholing seems to be based on
two concerns: (1) fairness and (2) manageability.
First, because scienter torts intuitively are less wrongful
than purposeful misconduct, there is a fear that full
enforcement will produce unjust results. This fear is well-
founded. The primary and immediate objective of a
purposeful intentional tort is to cause someone harm. Such
conduct threatens the bonds of political association and
disturbs the parties' moral equilibrium. However, the same
is not necessarily true of a scienter tort. Scienter torts are
not committed out of a desire to inflict harm. Although
harm is a known side effect, the motive for a scienter tort is
usually more self-directed. This motive, whatever it may
be, is not presumptively bad. In some cases it can be
socially and morally neutral, and in other cases quite good.
Because the motive cannot be known in advance, scienter
torts-unlike their purposeful counterparts-cannot be
prejudged. Instead, they must be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether their motives justify their
risks.
Intentional nuisance cases prove this point quite clearly.
Like all intentional torts, intentional nuisance requires
proof of intent. 7 However, unlike in other cases, proof of
intent is not sufficient to prove intentional nuisance. To
recover, the plaintiff has to prove both that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the use or enjoyment of his
property and that this interference was unreasonable.7 4 In
such cases, the defendant rarely acts with the exclusive
purpose of harming the plaintiff's interests. Instead, the
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defendant acts to promote his own interests, albeit with the
knowledge that those around him will be affected. Because
the defendant enjoys his own usage rights, his conduct,
even if knowingly harmful, is not necessarily wrongful. It
becomes wrongful only when it has an unreasonable effect
on others.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an
interference with property is unreasonable only if "the
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct," or "the harm caused by the conduct is serious and
the financial burden of compensating for this and similar
harm to others would not make the continuation of the
conduct not feasible. 75 In this context, liability cannot be
reduced to a bright-line rule. Instead, it must be found in
the balance of conflicting interests-a balance that only the
concept of reasonableness can provide.76
Second, beyond these fairness concerns, the scienter
form of intent is difficult to manage. Unlike a plan or
design, which has definite parameters, knowledge is not
necessarily defined by time or space. If I emit pollutants
from my factory smokestack for a period of twenty years,
my knowledge of the resulting danger to the community,
barring any changes in operation, is no less on the last day
than it was on the first. In fact, given the wisdom of
experience, it most likely will be greater. Similarly, if I
make a product that I know will harm some of my
customers and I still choose to sell that product all over the
world, my knowledge of its harmful legacy is in no way
diminished by the reach of my enterprise. If anything, the
ambition of my marketing only ensures more people will be
injured.
Fearful of scienter's vast scope, courts increasingly
71 Id. § 826 (a)-(b).
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 5 reporter's note to cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 1,2001).
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have increasingly attempted to reign it in, either by
construing it in ways that defy its plain meaning or by
invoking public policy. The opinion in Shaw v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.7 7 provides striking proof of both
tendencies. In Shaw, the plaintiff, a nonsmoker, brought a
battery action against Brown, a cigarette manufacturer.
The plaintiff claimed he had been injured by exposure to
second-hand smoke emitted from Brown's cigarettes. To
support his claim, the plaintiff alleged that, during the
eleven-year period between 1973 and 1984, he regularly
rode in an enclosed truck with a co-worker who smoked the
defendant's cigarettes and, as a result of inhaling the
ambient smoke, he eventually developed lung cancer.
Brown filed a motion to dismiss the claim, arguing the
plaintiff was unable to prove Brown had the requisite
intent. The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland agreed with Brown and dismissed the plaintiff's
battery action.
Tellingly, however, the court danced around the
scienter issue. In the late seventies and early eighties, when
there were few regulations limiting the places where people
could smoke, it was common knowledge that nonsmokers
frequently came into contact with ambient cigarette smoke.
Moreover, construing the facts in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, as was required on a motion to dismiss, the
court could have found that tobacco companies, like
Brown, knew second-hand smoke was harmful or offensive
to nonsmokers.78 If so, the plaintiff's case should have
77 973 F. Supp. 539 (D. Md. 1997).
78 The first petitions to ban smoking on airplanes were submitted as
early as 1969. See K. Neilsen & S. A. Glantz, A Tobacco Industry
Study ofAirline Cabin Air Quality: Dropping Inconvenient Findings, at
http://tc.bmjjoumals.com/cgi/content/full/13/suppLI/i20 (last visited
July 29, 2004). These petitions were based on the grounds that smoking
was both an annoyance and a health hazard to nonsmokers. Id. Studies
specifically linking secondhand smoke to lung cancer began to appear
in the medical literature in 1981. Id.
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gone forward. However, the court clearly did not want this
to happen. As the court explained, a finding that Brown
"ha[d] committed a battery by manufacturing cigarettes
would be tantamount to holding manufacturers of handguns
liable in battery for exposing third parties to gunfire."
79
"Such a finding," the court warned, "would expose the
courts to a flood of farfetched and nebulous litigation
concerning the tort of battery." 80
To avoid this problem, the court narrowed the
definition of scienter. Scienter, by itself, contains no
identity restriction. A person who explodes a megaton
bomb in an occupied building certainly knows he will
cause harm even if he is unaware of the names or the exact
number of his victims. Nevertheless, the Shaw court
expected both forms of prevision. Contradicting the
doctrine of transferred intent, which permits recovery by
victims unknown to the tortfeasor, the court required proof
that Brown actually knew the identities of the persons
exposed to and injured by its second-hand smoke. The
plaintiff was unable to prove the two requirements. In the
court's own words, "Brown ... did not know with a
substantial degree of certainty that second-hand smoke
would touch any particular non-smoker.",81 Although the
court acknowledged Brown "may have had knowledge that
second-hand smoke would reach some non-smokers," it
summarily concluded that "such generalized knowledge is
insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for battery."
82
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2. The Restatement (Third) "Solution"
Sparked by cases like Shaw, the American Law
Institute (ALI) recently reconsidered scienter's scope
problems. In its Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical Harm (Basic Principles),83 the ALI tentatively
adopted the traditional definition of scienter, stating that
"[a] person acts with intent to produce a consequence if...
[t]he person knows to a substantial certainty that the
consequence will ensue from the person's conduct." 84
Standing alone, this definition contained no inherent
restrictions-just the requirement that the defendant's
knowledge be linked to some forbidden consequence.
Nevertheless, the ALI substantially qualified its definition
in a comment, stating that "[t]he substantial-certainty
definition of intent requires an appreciation of its limits."
8 5
According to the ALI, "the substantial-certainty test should
be limited to situations in which the defendant has
knowledge to a substantial certainty that the conduct will
bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone
within a small class of potential victims within a localized
area.
' 86
The first limit-which requires knowledge of a
particular victim--is the same one recognized in Shaw.
Indeed, the ALI used Shaw for authority to support its
position. 87 To back up Shaw, the ALI observed that "[t]he
test loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential
victims becomes vaguer, and when in a related way the
time frame involving the actor's conduct expands and the
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
(BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1,2001).
4 See id. § 1(b).
85 Id. § 1 cmt. e.
86 id.
87 Id. reporter's note to cmt. e.
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causal sequence connecting conduct and harm becomes
more complex."
' 88
Like Shaw, however, the ALl did not explain its
reasoning. It merely went on to note that "the company's
knowledge of the certainty of harm, at some undefined time
and place, does provide an argument in favor of the
company's liability." 89 "[T]hat liability," it argued, is best
"understood as a form of strict liability, not as a liability for
anything that can properly be regarded as an intentional
tort."9 Yet, once again, it failed to support its contention.
It simply assumed, without discussion, that such cases
naturally fit the theory of strict liability and that its identity
restriction naturally fit the definition of intent.
The ALI's second scienter limit is more expansive than
the first. Although the ALl agreed with Shaw, it
recognized that Shaw's "victim identity" requirement
sometimes could be unduly restrictive. For example, an
employer might create a work site so dangerous that he
knows eventually it will cause injury to one of his
employees. Yet because the employer cannot predict which
employee will be harmed, his conduct, under Shaw, could
not be characterized as intentional.9' Likewise, an
aluminum smelting company that emits high levels of
particulate fluorides may actually know its activities will
harm its neighbors. But because it does not know the
identities of its victims, the company could not be held
liable for an intentional tort. 92
Finding these results unacceptable, the ALl added an
alternative to the victim identity requirement. Under this
alternative, scienter could exist, irrespective of the
defendant's knowledge of the victim's identity, so long as
88 Id. cmt. e.
89 id.
90 Id.
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the defendant knew he would harm some members of a
small class of people located within a small geographic
space. These "class" and "space" restrictions broadened
the definition of scienter by extending it from individuals to
groups. As redefined, scienter could now cover the
situations mentioned above. The employer would be an
intentional tortfeasor because he knowingly jeopardized the
safety of a definite group of people working in a mrrowly
defined area. Similarly, the smelter would be liable for an
intentional tort, at least to its immediate neighbors, because
it consciously placed this finite class of potential victims
into a finite danger zone.
In the end, however, neither the class and space
restrictions, nor the victim identity limit they are supposed
to complement, provide a fully satisfactory definition of
intent. As even the ALI concedes, intent can be directed
against either individuals or groups. Thus, any conception
of intent that encompasses only specific individuals is both
inaccurate and counterintuitive. Changing the limiting
criteria to include ideas of class and space does nothing to
make things better. In fact, it only seems to make matters
worse.
No doubt, there are cases in which time and distance
can disconnect an act's intent from its consequences. In the
smelting example mentioned above, the plant owner might
release pollutants on a single occasion. In that case, the
owner's knowledge of harm will decrease over time, since
the pollutants will gradually dissipate and eventually
disappear into the atmosphere. Even if the plant continues
to emit the pollution, the owner may reasonably expect its
effects to diminish as it continues to drift farther away.
In many cases, however, intent will be unaffected by
class or space considerations. Take the ALI's employer
example. A single person or corporate entity could run
thousands of workplaces all over a particular state or in
many different states. That person or entity could establish
225
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a company-wide policy that requires all such workplaces to
maintain the same deplorably bad working conditions,
knowing that some employees at each location will
eventually be injured. Under the Restatement Third
approach, the multi-workplace employer presumably would
not be liable for an intentional tort-even though he
possesses the same risk information and the same motive as
the single workplace employer-simply, and quite
ironically, because he endangers a far greater number of
people over a much wider territory.
The problem here is not simply that intentional tort law
excludes some torts that truly are intentional. After all, all
tort theories have limits that cut off liability at a certain
point. Rather, the problem is that the law's limits are
imposed in an arbitrary fashion. In negligence, liability is
limited primarily by foreseeability. Because foreseeability
is a flexible concept, it can often support various,
seemingly contradictory, interpretations. Still, no matter
how it is construed, foreseeability always retains a
normative grounding. 93 A person who can foresee a risk
has the power to control it. This power gives him the
normative responsibility to exercise that control with
reasonable care. By contrast, a person who cannot foresee
danger has no such power. He is just as surprised by, and
vulnerable to, the risk as anyone else. Thus, he bears no
responsibility to do anything about it.
The limits of intentional tort law lack such a normative
foundation. The person who gives an identified
acquaintance a product that he knows will cause injury
when put to its normal use acts in a way that is no more or
less intentional or culpable than the one who raffles off that
same product to an unidentified ticket-holder in a group of
complete strangers. Likewise, the manufacturer that sells a
93 See CALNAN, supra note 24, at 69-70, 131-32 (explaining the
normative basis of foreseeability).
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defective product to a small organization in a single
location-say a corporate office-is no worse a wrongdoer
than the manufacturer that sells the same item to consumers
all over the country. In fact, because the mass-distributor
knowingly inflicts harm on many more people, his
culpability seems that much greater. In each case, the
scienter limits do not track our moral sensibilities, as does
the concept of foreseeability; rather, they actively operate
to steer those sensibilities off course.
Admittedly, even the normative concept of
foreseeability occasionally gives way to other
considerations. This is particularly true in cases of
emotional distress94 and pure economic loss 95 where the
harms are relatively modest, easy to fake, and difficult to
authenticate. 96 In addition, the precipitating conduct,
though careless, is not designed to harm. 97 If such conduct
should have a ripple effect-injuring vast numbers of
people over an extended period of time or across a broad
geographic area-the person who commits the act can
sustain a crushing liability burden far in excess of his
culpability. 
98
The scienter limits are much harder to justify. Unlike
94 For instance, a negligent actor who induces emotional distress in
bystanders is not necessarily liable to all of his foreseeable victims.
Instead, his liability is limited to bystanders who are present when he
misbehaves, who contemporaneously perceive the calamitous event he
creates, and who are closely related to those he physically endangers.
See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968) (adopting a
foreseeability test based on these three factors). See generally DOBBS,
supra note 7, at 840-41 (discussing Dillon and its progeny).
Tortfeasors who inflict pure economic loss enjoy similar protections.
In some jurisdictions, they have no responsibility at all. See DOBBS,
supra note 7, at 1283-85. In others, they are liable only to victims who
are particularly foreseeable or with whom they share a special
relationship. See id. at 1285-87.
96 See DIAMOND,supra note 28, at 173,189-90.
97 See id. at 189-90.
9' See id. at 173, 189-90.
227
51
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL I: 2
negligence, which is based on an ambiguous and
unrestricted normative standard, intentional torts are based
on the subjective and factual concept of intent-a concept
that is circumscribed only by the breadth and depth of one's
actual knowledge. Moreover, whereas the negligence
limits clamp down on moderate and suspicious harms, the
class and space limits of intentional tort law deny recovery
for all forms of harm, including serious physical injuries.
Worse still, while the negligence limits protect inadvertent
tortfeasors from bearing disproportionate liabilities, the
scienter limits protect intentional tortfeasors, inarguably the
worst kind of tortious offenders, from the consequences of
their deliberate misdeeds. Ironically, even when these
limits do permit a finding of intent, they catch only small-
time tortfeasors and let the big-time operators go free,
affording the latter a liberty of action that may or may not
be abated by some other theory of recovery.
In pointing this out, I do not mean to suggest that
intentional torts should have no limits or that all large-scale
actors should be considered intentional tortfeasors. I would
not support either proposition. What I do mean to show,
however, is that the concept of scienter itself contains few
limits; and when it is applied as currently defined, and not
capriciously limited, it is dangerously broad and potentially
unfair. Moreover, because scienter covers situations
already addressed by other theories, it may also be
redundant and unnecessary.
The problems alone are not news. Indeed, they have
been flagged by previous commentators, who have called
for scienter's reconsideration or abolition.99 The real news,
99 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and
Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating the Law, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1138-43 (2001) (proposing changes to the
Restatement Third's definition of"scienter"); Anthony J. Sebok,
Purpose, Belief and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third) 's
Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1180 (2001) (advocating
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as we shall see below, is that such flaws are symptomatic of
a far worse malady that cannot be cured by any quick-fix
solution.
IV. Unreasonable Intentional Torts
The transferred intent, mistake, and scienter anomalies
reveal at least a partial misalignment between the concept
of intent and the conduct it now describes. However, a
closer look reveals something even more pernicious. It
shows that intentional tort liability is not, as the name
implies, actually based on intent. Rather, it is always based
on the concept of reasonableness. This conclusion rests on
three important findings: (1) intent is a species of
reasonableness; (2) intent creates a presumption of
unreasonableness; and (3) reasonable intentional acts are
not actionable.
These findings create yet another paradox for the
current paradigm. If, as that paradigm suggests,
reasonableness is a hallmark of negligence theory, then
intentional torts and negligence are not theoretical
strangers, but are actually fraternal twins within the same
theoretical family.
A. The Reasonableness in Intent
According to the conventional paradigm, intentional
torts are sui generis. They do not impose strict liability
because they are based on fault. They are not a form of
negligence because they are based on intent, not
reasonableness. In fact, intent and negligence are supposed
to be entirely separate and distinct concepts.'00 Intent is
willful; negligence is accidental. Intent's consequences are
the abolishment of scienter).
100 DOBBS, supra note 7, at 50.
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calculated; negligence's are unexpected and unwanted.
Although intent can be based on knowledge without a
purpose, the knowledge threshold for intent never overlaps
that of negligence. A substantial certainty of harm is
intent; anything less is merely a reckless or negligent
disregard of a probable risk.'O'
Like any classificatory system, tort law's theoretical
paradigm is only as strong as its conceptual dividing
lines. 10 2 Unfortunately, these lines are frequently fuzzy,
pliable, or poorly drawn. This is especially true of the fault
matrix. When that matrix is removed from the body of tort
law, the law's true structure becomes readily apparent.
Intent, we learn, is not an independent basis of liability.
Rather, it is merely a subspecies of the broader concept of
reasonableness.
As noted above, the test of intent is subjective. To meet
this test, the defendant must actually desire to bring about a
harmful consequence, or he must, at the very least, actually
know to a substantial certainty that such a consequence will
follow from his actions. 103 The test of negligence,
however, is objective. It holds people to a standard of
reasonable care. 1°4 If the current paradigm were correct,
these tests would never overlap. The test for intent would
not capture any acts of negligence, and the test for
negligence would not cover any intentional misdeeds.
However, nothing could be farther from the truth. In
fact, every intentional tort always fails the objective test of
reasonableness. Reasonableness is simply a heuristic
"0 See id. at 52.
102 Categorical integrity is not only a constraint ofjurisprudence, but
also a requirement of all taxonomies. Reptiles are by definition cold-
blooded and scaly; mammals are warm-blooded and hairy. Thus, no
snake could ever be a mammal, and no dog could ever be a reptile. The
classifications of "reptile" and "mammal" work because their defining
criteria are clear and accurate.
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device designed to capture a community's sense of right
and wrong. 105 When directed at intentional torts, this moral
instinct is clear and unwavering. 106 A reasonable person
does not batter, imprison, or trespass unless he has a good
excuse or justification She does not deliberately interfere
with the interests of others without their consent. And he
certainly does inflict harm with a malicious motive.
Because intentional tortfeasors always act counter to
reason, their conduct always offends society's objective
standard of reasonable behavior.
Once this fact is recognized, it quickly becomes
apparent that intent and reasonableness are more alike than
different. Reasonableness is the concept that explains
liability judgments in both theories. 107 Their difference is
105 See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 7 ("[T]he law of torts is concerned
not solely with individually questionable conduct but as well with acts
which are unreasonable, or socially harmful, from the point of view of
the community as a whole."); see also Patrick G. Kelley, Who Decides:
Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 315 (1990) (emphasizing the role of community
conventions in the determination of reasonableness).
106 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes:
For the established intentional torts, this balancing process
[that is, the balancing process used in negligence and strict
liability] has been already worked out and developed in the
form of a set of rules. The individual torts have been set up
to protect interests of the injured party, with their individual
attributes designated by legal rules. The interests of the
actor are protected by a set of established privileges, with
their individual attributes also established by legal rules.
There is thus no need of using the balancing process afresh
for each case in which as established tort exists; and the task
is merely to apply the legal rules to the facts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. c (1979).
107 In my recent book, A Revisionist History of Tort Law: From
Holmesian Realism to Neoclassical Rationalism, I show how all tort
theories, including the earliest intentional torts, arose from the classical,
natural law concept of reasonableness. See ALAN CALNAN, A
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one of degree, not kind. Because intentional torts are
deliberative, they often appear more unreasonable than
mere acts of carelessness. Yet in the end, all tortious acts
are wrongful for the same basic reason: they are unfair.
According to Aristotle, who first recognized
reasonableness as both a source of law and a standard of
legal decision-making, reason demands justice and justice
demands fairness. 10 8 Specifically, justice dictates that
people should receive their fair share of liberty and
security. Both intentional tortfeasors and negligent actors
violate this mandate. They exercise excessive freedom, and
unduly inhibit the freedom of others.'°9 Granted, they do
so in different ways. The intentional tortfeasor flouts the
general social proscription against doing harm to others. l10
The negligent actor, on the other hand, assumes a liberty of
self-absorption not enjoyed by others.1I' Nevertheless,
each offending act is inequitable, and each offender is a
cheater. The fact that the act is intentional does not free it
from the constraints of reasonableness. Rather, it merely
places that act into a subset within this broader normative
universe.
In saying this, I certainly do not wish to suggest that
negligence and intentional torts are morally equivalent or
that each claim must be litigated in the exact same way. In
fact, in the next section, I shall explain how intentional tort
law shifts evidentiary burdens in accordance with the
dictates of reasonableness. All I mean to suggest is that the
classificatory structure of the current paradigm is
fundamentally flawed, and its depiction of the law's
REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO
NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM (2005).
108 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 24,55,144-49 (J.E.C.
Welldon trans., Prometheus Books 1987).
109 See CALNAN, SUpra note 24, at 72, 129, 167, 188-89.
11o See id. at 167.
... See id. at 188-89.
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intrinsic nature is seriously distorted.
B. Intent as a Presumption of Unreasonableness
What makes the interrelationship between intent and
reasonableness so elusive is its clandestine nature.
Reasonableness is not identified as an element of any
intentional tort except nuisance. It certainly is not
acknowledged as a basis of liability. In fact, it is rarely
even discussed. This omission, however, does not mean, as
the modem paradigm suggests, that reasonableness and
intent are irreconcilable concepts. Rather, it means that the
notion of reasonableness is already ingrained in the element
of intent.
The determination of reasonableness depends in each
case upon the characteristics of the conduct under scrutiny.
Acts that are common, self-directed, or useful are difficult
to judge. They are not inherently unreasonable, but
become unreasonable only if they are poorly performed. 
112
For example, there is nothing wrong with driving a car, but
driving fast in heavy traffic on a wet, windy road is clearly
inappropriate. Here, fault is a function of context. 113 Since
licensed adults are permitted to drive cars, the act of
driving cannot be condemned without looking at the time,
place, and manner in which it is conducted.
Other acts are wrongful per se. These acts are
inherently unreasonable-meaning, they are socially
inappropriate most of the time. 114 Certainly, purposeful
intentional torts fall into this category. To live in a liberal
democracy, each citizen must relinquish her natural
freedom and must agree to respect the freedoms of others.
Specifically, she must agree to respect the freedoms of
everyone else. Laws are created to enforce this restraint.
112 See id. at 178.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 166-67.
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They make individual will subordinate to group equality.
Purposeful torts disrupt this scheme. The deliberate
tortfeasor shows no restraint. Acting at will, he ignores the
wills of others. In so doing, he not only repudiates the
notion of equality, he thumbs his nose at the rule of law.
Indeed, this message is so powerful, it requires no
further elaboration. Unreasonableness is embodied in the
desire to harm. Thus, the victim of a purposeful tort does
not have to prove unreasonableness; unreasonableness is
automatically presumed from proof of intent.
This presumption is based on both fact and policy. As a
factual matter, experience shows purposeful harms are both
highly dangerous and socially disruptive. Thus, in most
cases, the presumption of unreasonableness answers the
question of liability correctly. From a policy standpoint,
the presumption of unreasonableness serves the goals of
education and deterrence. It both teaches and warns future
actors that intentionally harmful behavior is strongly
discouraged and must be undertaken with great
circumspection.
Despite its accuracy and social utility, this presumption
is not absolute. There may be instances where intentionally
harmful acts are permissible or even desirable. To rebut
the presumption of unreasonableness, however, one must
be able to identify extraordinary circumstances that warrant
relief from the strict letter of the law.1 15 In the next section,
we shall see that tort law routinely entertains such rebuttals,
usually as affirmative defenses. Although these defenses
take many forms, they all find support in the same
principle. The only thing that can rebut a presumption of
unreasonableness is proof of reasonableness itself.
... See id. at 169.
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C. Unactionability of Reasonable Intentional Acts
Intentional tort law recognizes a number of privileges
and defenses. Some, like self-defense and defense of
others, apply to torts against persons. Others, like defense
of property and recovery of property, apply only to
property torts. Still others, like consent and necessity, have
general application. Nevertheless, all of these defenses
have two things in common: they ensure that liability is
grounded in reasonableness, and they prove that reasonable
intentional acts are not actionable.
With the exception of consent, every intentional tort
privilege contains the same two elements of proof. The
first element determines whether the defendant's decision
to act was justified. I shall call this the "decision element."
The second element determines whether the defendant
performed that act in an appropriate way. I will refer to
this as the "performance element." In each case,
reasonableness is used as the standard of evaluation. 16
For defenses to personal injury torts, courts openly
base the decision element on reasonableness. In all cases
of self-defense, and many cases of defense of others, the
defendant's right to act depends on whether he had a
reasonable belief that there was a need for action. 117
We saw examples of this decision-based reasonableness
analysis in the istake cases discussed earlier. In Smith,
the landowner who reasonably mistook the paperboy for a
prowler was justified in trying to stop him. 118 Likewise, in
Boyer, the homeowner who reasonably feared for the safety
of his family was permitted to defend them against some
116 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 156-57 (noting that "U]ustifications
tend to invoke objective standards of reasonableness to modify the flat
rules of trespassory torts.").
117 See id. at 163 n.3.
118 Smith, 114 So.2d at 849.
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suspected trespassers."l 9 Given the gravity of the interests
at stake, the imminence of the danger, and the absence of
time for deliberation, reasonableness gave these actors a
right to act on their instincts, even if those instincts later
proved to be mistaken.
Some privileges, such as recovery of property, routinely
eschew reasonableness in the decision element. 120 Other
privileges, such as defense of land or third persons,
occasionally display the same tendency. 121 These
privileges authorize a response when there is an actual
need for such action, and not when the actor reasonably
believes this to be the case. Nevertheless, reasonableness
remains important to the ultimate determination of liability.
Its role is just more understated.
In property cases, reasonableness accounts for the
actual need standard itself. Here, as elsewhere,
reasonableness balances risk and benefit. In a hierarchy of
value, property interests rank relatively low on the scale,
certainly lower than an interest in bodily integrity. Thus,
they deserve less protection. On the other hand, the
defense and recovery of property pose a high risk of
mistake. Personal property is often easy to steal and even
easier to conceal or transfer. Thus, self-help repossessors
may easily go after either the wrong person or wrong
property.
Similarly, real property is often easy to invade and even
easier to escape. Thus, a landowner may easily
misinterpret or overreact to the intrusion. In these
119 Boyer, 24 Cal.Rptr. at 195.
120 PROSSER, supra note 16, at 138. An exception is made for
merchants. Under the shopkeeper's privilege, "a merchant who
reasonably believes that a person has committed a theft or has
attempted a theft may detain the person for a limited period of time and
for the limited purpose of the investigating the facts." DOBBS, supra
note 7, at 196.
121 PROSSER, supra note 16, at 130, 131-32.
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situations, the need for precaution is greater. Where the
facts are clear, it is reasonable to act on perception. But
where the property or the perpetrator is in doubt and the
danger of overreaching is palpable, reasonableness requires
the property owner to think before he acts.
Reasonableness works the same way in defense of
others. In this scenario, a bystander witnesses an encounter
between two or more individuals. Although the bystander
himself is not in danger, he may believe one of the
combatants is. Here, too, the chances of mistake are great.
Because the bystander is not involved in the confrontation,
he may not know how it started or who holds the upper
hand. Also, because such events unfold rapidly, he may
not have time for investigation or rational deliberation. If
he is correct, he may save the day. But if he is wrong, he
may place himself in jeopardy, violate the rights of others,
and expand the altercation. In such cases, reasonableness
counsels caution before action.
Unlike the decision element, the performance element
always rests on reasonableness. Once invoked, this second
tier of reasonableness continues the search for
proportionality and balance. Since balance measures
actions and reactions, a reasonable privilege -holder may
not exceed his right to respond. 122 Specifically, he may not
seize the opportunity to punish his adversary or teach him a
lesson. Rather, he must use only the force necessary to end
the threat to his rights. Once that threat is gone, he must
desist from further action.
To illustrate, in Andrepont v. Naquin,'23 two teenage
boys were engaged in a fistfight. During the struggle, the
defendant retrieved a baseball bat and struck the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued for battery. In response, the defendant
argued that the plaintiff had consented to the fight. The
122 DOBBS,supra note 7, at 156.
123 345 So.2d 1216 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
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jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant
appealed. In upholding the judgment, the Louisiana Court
of Appeals found that the defendant had used unreasonable
force. Here, the risk posed by the defendant's bat far
exceeded the risk posed by the plaintiff's fists. This
excessive force, in turn, negated the plaintiffs consent. As
the court explained, "The force employed by the defendant
was not used in defense, was in excess of what was
reasonably necessary to repel the advances of the plaintiff
or his group, and was an implementation of force to which
the plaintiff did not consent." 124
In this and every other case of privilege, the defendant's
intentional act creates a presumption of unreasonableness.
This presumption can be rebutted only by its conceptual
opposite. Thus, the defendant must show both that he made
a reasonable decision to act, and that his chosen response
was reasonable under the circumstances. By meeting this
burden, he overcomes the presumption that his conduct was
unreasonable. This may be true even though his act was
designed to harm or was committed with the knowledge
that it would injure someone else. Whether the defendant
is defending his person or protecting his property, proof of
his intent never ends the discussion of liability. It merely
shifts that discussion to the ultimate issue of
reasonableness.
V. Strict Intentional Tort Liability
The discovery that intentional tort liability is not
necessarily based on intent significantly weakens the
current paradigm's fault matrix, since it repudiates one-half
of that matrix's two-sided structure. The additional
revelation that intentioml torts are really based on
reasonableness only makes matters worse. If all intentional
124 Id. at 1220.
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torts are unreasonable, then they are not unlike acts of
negligence, and if negligence and intentional torts are
basically the same, then the matrix is wrong to keep them
apart.
This being said, the fault matrix still serves to separate
negligence and intentional torts from the theory of strict
liability. Operating on the assumption that fault and strict
liability are antithetical concepts, it creates a veritable
firewall between the two. With this barrier in place, the
two concepts are supposed to remain independent. Strict
liability should never include intentional misconduct, and
no intentional tort should ever impose strict liability. Yet,
as I will discuss below, this is not the case. Intentional torts
and strict liability are kindred spirits, not opposite
extremes. In fact, they are more than close relatives; they
are virtually one and the same.
A. The Characteristics of True Strict Liability
Admittedly, such a claim is hard to substantiate-but
not because of a lack of proof. Rather, the difficulty lies in
the theory of strict liability itself. Strict liability is not a
clear concept. It has no definite rationale and recognizes
no anchoring principle. 125 It employs no uniform standard
of evaluation and maintains no fixed elemental structure. 1
26
125 Unlike intentional torts and negligence, strict liability does not
reveal its ratio decedendi. Intentional torts have intent. Negligence has
reasonableness. Strict liability has no stated norm. At best, it merely
describes a policy-based aspiration or conclusion that liability should
be more certain or rigorous than usual. Because policy is in the eye of
the beholder, and shifts like grains of sand, strict liability is an empty
phrase. Indeed, "strictness" detached from a fixed reference point is
nothing but vacuous relativity.
126 In fact, strict liability is not really even a single, cohesive theory of
recovery. Rather, it is an eclectic group of disjointed tests, elements
and approaches lumped together under the same theoretical moniker.
Among all strict liability "theories," there is no uniform liability
239
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trigger. For animals, strict liability depends on "wildness" or
"viciousness." See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 945, 947-49. For activities,
liability depends on "ultrahazardousness" or "abnormality." Id. at 952-
54. For products, liability depends on "defectiveness" and/or
"unreasonable danger." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2 (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). For agency relationships, liability depends on "scope of
employment" and "control." Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 139-
41 (Alaska 1972). There certainly may be common principles
underlying these disparate standards. In fact, I believe such principles
do exist. However, these commonalities, whatever they may be, are
neither recognized by the current paradigm nor proposed by the ALl in
its new restatement.
Within each liability theory, liability triggers have not remained
constant. The standard for animals has shifted from incitement to
scienter. See ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE
BLACK DEATH, 1348-1381; 230-45 (1993). The standard for activities
has shifted from unnaturalness to ultrahazardousness to abnormality.
See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 950-54. The standard for products has
shifted from consumer expectations to risk-utility analysis to
reasonable alternative designs. See id. at 981-82, 985-87. Even the
standard for agency relationships has shifted from
command/ratification to control to enterprise liability. See PROSSER,
supra note 22, at 500-01.
Finally, even where the same standards are used, they often are
inconsistently interpreted and applied. Some courts have interpreted
strict liability to mean absolute liability (this tendency is especially
apparent in cases involving the storage of explosives). See Exner v.
Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931); Yukon Equip.,
Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978). Others
have interpreted the concept to mean reasonableness (this interpretation
often appears, albeit be grudgingly, in products cases). See Phipps v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 962 (Md. 1976X"The doctrine of
strict liability is really but another form of negligence per se, in that it is
a judicial determination that placing a defective product on the market
which is unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer is itself a
negligent act sufficient to impose liability on the seller."). Still others
peg the standard somewhere in between (this approach also shows up
frequently in products cases, usually in the form of imputed knowledge
or hindsight balancing tests). See Sperry-New Holland, a Div. of
Sperry Corp. v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248,253 (Miss. 1993)("he extent
of strict liability of a manufacturer for harm caused by its product is not
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In short, it lacks most of the attributes necessary to identify
it as a distinctive theory of recovery.
Nevertheless, it is possible, without getting mired in too
much detail, to identify two defining characteristics of strict
liability and to use these characteristics as the basis for our
comparison. According to its legal definition, strict
liability is liability without fault. 127 This means, at the very
least, the plaintiff is not required to present evidence of the
defendant's fault in order to recover for his loss. However,
it also has a broader meaning. It suggests that, the fault
element aside, the plaintiff generally should enjoy an easier
road to recovery, and the defendant generally should find it
harder to escape liability.
These related objectives could be achieved in various
ways. As noted earlier, all fault-based torts contain a
number of elements other than fault. 128 Specifically, they
include a limitation element, a causation element and a
damage element. They also admit one or more affirmative
defenses.
Within this scheme, there presumably is a norm-some
standard combination of elements and defenses that applies
in most situations most of the time. According to the
current paradigm, that norm is the theory of negligence,
which sits in the middle of the fault continuum, half way
between the theories of intentional torts and strict
liability. 129 If negligence is the proper benchmark, then
liability becomes "stricter" anytime any part of its liability
scheme is slanted in the plaintiffs favor.
This means true strict liability can be achieved in a
variety of ways. One way is to relax the standards set for
that of an insurer.... However, strict liability does relieve the plaintiff
of the onerous burden of proving negligence (i.e. fault). Fault is
supplied as a matter of law.").
127 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6t' ed. 1990).
128 See supra note 34 & Figure 3.
129 See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 6 (2003).
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establishing responsibility, causation and damages.
Another is to shift the burden of proof on one or more of
these elements. Still another is to reduce or eliminate the
limitations on liability and/or the defendant's available
defenses. Each alteration and shift is significant because it
releases the law from its liability norm and moves it farther
and farther towards a normative extreme. Indeed, the
greater the number of these changes, and the more dramatic
the change in each area, the stricter the resulting liability
theory will be.
Amazingly, intentional torts-the supposed polar
opposite of strict liability-contain many of these plaintiff-
friendly characteristics. Indeed, as a group, intentional
torts are decidedly strict in both substance and procedure.
They take a broad focus, presumptively condemning all
intentional harms regardless of the specific manner in
which they occur. They create expansive duties, extending
their protection to remote and even unforeseeable victims.
Most important, they actively champion the plaintiff's
cause, shifting to the defendant the burden of excusing his
behavior and limiting his affirmative defenses.
B. The Strictness of Intentional Tort Law
1. Categorical, Activity-Based Focus
According to the current paradigm, strict liability is
unique because it regulates activities, not acts. 30 For
example, keeping a wild or vicious animal is an inherently
130 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 20 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2001 )("[A] prerequisite for the strict liability rule...is not merely a
highly significant risk associated with the activity itself, but a highly
significant risk that remains with the activity even when all actors
exercise reasonable care.").
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dangerous activity. '3 Thus, if the animal escapes, the
keeper is liable for the resulting loss, even if he took
extraordinary measures to keep the animal contained. 1
32
Likewise, detonating explosives is an abnormally
dangerous activity. 133 Thus, should the blast cause harm to
another, the blaster remains responsible for the damage, no
matter how much care he took to prevent it. 134 In each
case, the law looks not at the activity's performance, but at
its inherent risk characteristics.
Intentional torts are no different. Though cast in the
form of fault, they too judge behavior at the broadest level
of generality. 135 In fact, all intentional torts evaluate the
"activity" of intentionally harming others. Such calculated
behavior is presumptively suspect, regardless of how it is
conducted, because it jeopardizes the rights of unwitting
victims, subverts the rule of law, and disturbs the peace and
order of society. Thus, to recover for an intentional tort, a
plaintiff never has to prove the defendant acted in a
wrongful manner. He need only prove the defendant
engaged in a suspect activity while motivated by the
requisite intent.
Battery actions makes this plain. In many situations, a
battery victim can prove his offender behaved in an
inappropriate way. However, he is not required to do so in
order to recover. As we saw earlier, a plaintiff injured by
mistake can prevail on his intentional tort action without
131 DOBBS, supra note 7, at 945, 947-48.
132 Id. at 945,947.
133 Id. at 955.
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520cmt. h (1977).
135 Of course, a defendant may narrow this focus by asserting a
privilege. In effect, the privilege shifts the focus from the mere
commission of the intentional activity to the specific details of the
defendant's behavior, thus initiating a determination as to whether the
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proving the perpetrator did anything wrong. 13 6 Similarly,
someone victimized by an overzealous act of self-defense
need not demonstrate his attacker used an unreasonable
amount of force.' 37 Indeed, in each case, the plaintiff's
only normative burden is to show that the defenlant desired
to cause a harmful or offensive contact or that he knew to a
substantial certainty that such contact would result from his
act.
Once this burden is met and causality is demonstrated,
the defendant is held liable unless he can establish some
excuse or justification for his actions. In this way,
intentional acts are like any other kind of strict liability
activity. They are categorically actionable because of their
inherent characteristics and, until justified, are presumed to
inflict unfair losses on their victims.
2. Expansive Duties
In addition to taking a categorical approach to
intentional activity, intentional tort law casts a protective
safety net that is perhaps even more expansive than that of
strict liability. Granted, the theories of strict liability cover
a wider variety of high-risk activities, but on an individual
basis, the duties of intentional tort law appear as tough and
far-reaching as any found in the law of torts.
Strict liability duties are limited by concepts of
forseeability and abnormality. 138 The duty to refrain from
136 See Ranson, 31111. App. at 241 (holding that a dog owner could
sustain a conversion action against hunters despite the hunters' claim
that they shot the dog by mistake).
137 See Andrepont, 345 So.2d at 1220 (holding that a participant in a
fistfight could sustain a battery action against his co-combatant despite
the latter's claim that he wielded a bat in self-defense).
138 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (b),
(c) (1998) (providing that liability for design and warning defects is
limited to the foreseeable risks posed by the offending product);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977)(stating that the
244
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intentionally harming others, however, is free of virtually
all temporal or spatial constraints. In fact, it may not even
be circumscribed by the motive of the actor. The doctrines
of transferred intent and mistake make this apparent. If the
defendant shoots a gun at one person but the bullet strikes
some unseen passerby, the concept of transferred intent still
holds him liable for committing a battery. 1'3 9 In this
scenario, the duty not to deliberately shoot at people is so
important and unrelenting it follows the bullet and attaches
intent wherever it goes. Similarly, if the defendant believes
he is shooting at a wild animal which turns out to be
someone's pet, the defendant, and not the pet owner, bears
responsibility for the mistake. 140 Here again, the duty to
control the gun is so onerous and expansive, it protects
virtually anyone injured by the intentional discharge of that
weapon.
Besides protecting many people, intentional tort law
also protects many interests. All traditional strict liability
theories secure tangible interests. Thus, as a precondition
to recovery, they require proof of actual injury. However,
most intentional torts also secure intangible interests like
freedom, equality, and dignity. When one person willfully
intrudes upon the seclusion of another, these interests are
compromised and harm is presumed. Thus, the victim can
institute a lawsuit and recover nominal damages, even if he
abnormally dangerous activity theory of "strict liability is limited to the
kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally
dangerous.").
"' See Corn, 229 N.W. at 871; see also Manning v. Grimsley, 643
F.2d 20 (1 st Cir. 1981Ximposing liability against a defendant who
threw a ball at a heckler but hit another spectator); Singer v. Marx, 301
P.2d 440 (Cal. 1956)(imposing liability against a defendant who threw
a rock at one child but hit another); Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656
(Mich. 1894)(imposing liability against a defendant who threw a stick
at one boy but hit another).
140 See Ranson, 31111. App. at 241 (imposing liability against
defendants who shot a dog believing it to be a wolf).
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suffered no discernable injuries.14 1 Here, the tortfeasor's
duty to pay is not conditioned on the victim's loss, but
arises automatically upon the completion of his tort. Such
a duty, though presumably fault-based, appears to "out-
strict" even the strictest of strict liability duties.
3. Proof of Facts, Not Fault
If there is a weakness in the analogy between strict
liability and intentional torts, it seems to be in their
respective bases of liability. At first, it sounds strange to
think of an intentional tort as a no -fault liability vehicle.
Indeed, what could be worse than deliberately trying to hurt
another person or ignoring a near certain risk that one's act
would cause him harm?
Yet the more closely we examine intentional tort law,
the more uncertain its substantive basis becomes. In my
judgment, all tort law is,142 or at least was and should be,
143
grounded in some notion of fault. Therefore, the very idea
of a faultless tortfeasor is hard for me to accept. But if we
interpret strict liability to mean the plaintiff need not prove
the defendant's fault, then, in this sense at least, any
intentional tort could be described as a no-fault liability
1 See Neely v. Coffey, 410 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 1980) (holding a
trespasser liable for nominal damages); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C.
371 (1835)("From every ... entry against the will of the possessor, the
law infers some damage...."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158
(1965)(stating that an actor may be "subject to another for trespass,
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected
interest of the other....").
142 See generally CALNAN, supra note 24 (explaining the moral
foundations of all tort law, including the supposedly fault-free theory of
strict liability).
143 See CALNAN, supra note 109 (revealing that all tort theories,
including the theory of strict liability, arose from a classical, fault-
based conception of reasonableness).
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theory. 144
This idea only sounds incongruous under the artificial
and misleading constraints of the current paradigm. Once
these constraints are removed, the connection between
intentional torts and strict liability becomes surprisingly
clear.
Intent, we see, is not necessarily synonymous with
fault. Rather, it is merely a factual description of a
person's state of mind-a description that may or may not
fit the definition of culpability. When intent is malicious,
proof of this fact can create a conclusive inference of fault.
However, when intent is not malicious, it may have almost
no probative value at all. Indeed, if the defendant's motive
is innocent or even commendable, his conduct may be
intentional but not wrongful. The defendant's motive,
however, is not the plaintiff's concern. So long as the
plaintiff can establish the defendant's intent, he need not
worry about whether that intent was also faulty.
We saw evidence of this paradox in the mistake cases
discussed earlier. Whether the mistake is one of identity or
ownership, the plaintiff's only burden is to show the
defendant acted with volition. 145 Once he carries this
burden, he has nothing left to prove and nothing left to fear.
The defendant cannot counter by saying that he did not
144 Two "intentional" torts-private nuisance and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED)-actually do require some proof of
"fault." In "intentional" nuisance cases, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's interference was unreasonable. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (a) (1979). In IIED cases, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's behavior was not only extreme and
outrageous, but also intentional or reckless. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1) (1965).
45 See Ranson, 31 Ill. App. at 241 (holding defendant liable for
voluntarily shooting a domestic pet mistaken even though he mistook it
for a wild animal); Perry, 39 S.E. at 523 (holding defendant liable for
voluntarily entering plaintiff s property even though he mistook that
property for his own).
71
248 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL I: 2
desire to commit a tort or know that one would occur. He
also cannot disprove his fault by arguing that he acted
under a reasonable misapprehension of the circumstances.
Because his decision was deliberate and his conduct
unprovoked, he is strictly liable for his mistake. Even if the
defendant raises a privilege, it is not the plaintiff's burden
to prove he was at fault. In these scenarios, evidence of the
defendant's intent merely triggers the fault issue; it does
not actually resolve it.
Battery actions drive home this point. Most batteries
are not random occurrences. Rather, they are bilateral
encounters that arise out of preexisting relationships or
prior events. Frequently, the defendant reacts to some
threat posed by the plaintiff. 146 This reaction, though
intentionally harmful, is not necessarily tortious. It
becomes tortious only if the defendant acted unreasonably,
either by responding without adequate provocation or by
using excessive force. However, the reasonableness issue
is not the plaintiff s problem. The plaintiff may prevail
without offering any proof on this subject. Instead, the
entire burden of proving reasonableness, or the lack
thereof, belongs to the defendant. After the plaintiff
establishes intent, the defendant must prove that his
response was reasonable under the circumstances. If he
does not, he is liable regardless of his guilt or innocence.
For both parties, intentional tort liability is far from
ordinary. From the defendant's standpoint, it is especially
onerous. From the plaintiff s perspective, it is all but fault-
free. Granted, fault may infiltrate the facts, but it does so
only from the defendant's side, and only if he is unable to
provide some reasonable justification for his actions.
146 See Bennett v. Dunn, 507 So.2d 451 (Ala. 1987)(defendant shot the
plaintiff as he attempted to steal his truck); Crabtree v. Dawson, 83
S.W. 557 (Ky. 1904Xdefendant struck the plaintiff in the belief that the
plaintiff was about to attack him with bricks); Andrepont, 345 So.2d at
1220 (plaintiff was injured during a scuffle with the defendant).
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4. Few and Narrow Defenses
In addition to limiting the plaintiff s burden of proof,
intentional torts also restrict the substantive defenses
available to the defendant. As noted above, the goal of
strict liability is to make it harder for a defendant to avoid
liability. One of the best ways to do this is by sealing off
the conceptual exits to the plaintiffs theory of recovery.
Strict liability traps a defendant in the liability maze by
taking away or eviscerating defenses like contributory
negligence, 147 comparative fault, 148 or assumption of
risk. 149 Intentional torts go to the same extreme, and then
go one step further.
Most jurisdictions which have adopted comparative
fault have refused to apply it to intentional torts. 150 As a
147 See Shield v. Morton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857 (Idaho 1974)
(holding that "the better reasoned view is that contributory negligence
in the sense of the failure to discover the defect or to guard against its
existence is not a defense to strict liability in tort."); Sandy v. Bushey,
128 A. 513 (Me. 1925Xrejecting a contributory negligence defense in a
vicious animal case); Abbott v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 682 S.W.2d
206 (Tenn Ct. App. 1984)(rejecting a contributory negligence defense
in a strict products liability case).
148 See Lutz v. Nat. Crane Corp. 884 P.2d 455 (Mont. 1994)(refusing to
apply comparative fault in a strict products liability case); Kimco Dev.
Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993)(refusing
to apply comparative fault in a strict products liability case); Phillips v.
Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991)(refusing to apply
comparative fault in a strict products liability case).
149 See Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
(stating that "[t]he doctrine of assumed risk is harsh and will not be
extended" in a strict products liability action).
150 See Whitlock v. Smith, 762 S.W.2d 782 (Ark. 1989Xholding that
comparative fault does not mitigate liability for an intentional tort);
Terrell v. Hester, 355 S.E. 2d 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)(holding that
comparative fault does not mitigate liability for an intentional tort);
Carman v. Heber, 601 P.2d 646 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979)(holding that
comparative fault does not mitigate liability for an intentional tort); see
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matter of both policy and logic, it makes little sense to
relieve intentional tortfeasors of liability because their
victims may have carelessly exposed themselves to the
deliberate machinations of others.151
Many jurisdictions also severely curtail the use of
consent and assumption of risk in intentional tort actions. 
152
For example, express assumption of risk clauses which
disclaim responsibility for intentional torts are routinely
dismissed on public policy grounds. 153 Moreover, when
two intentional tortfeasors injure one another in mutual
combat, courts often prohibit either participant from raising
the privilege of consent. 54 In each case, the defendant's
conduct is so dangerous or exploitative, and the plaintiffs
acquiescence so questionable, courts simply foreclose any
argument that the parties' encounter was truly consensual.
Even where intentional tort privileges are recognized,
there is no guarantee the defendant will be relieved of
generally DOBBS, supra note 7, at 517-21 (discussing the reasons for
the rule).
15 1 However, some courts apply comparative fault principles in multiple
defendant scenarios, where at least one defendant is an intentional
tortfeasor. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 518.
152 See Blankinship v. Duarte, 669 P.2d 994 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the trial court erred by giving an assumption of risk
instruction in a intentional tort case); Navarre v. Ostdiek, 518 P.2d
1362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that "[a]ssumption of risk as a
defense in a negligence action is not a proper defense to the intentional
torts of assault and battery.").
153 See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 484 (stating that "such agreements
generally are not construed to cover the more extreme forms of
negligence.. .or to any conduct which constitutes an intentional tort.").
154 See Hudson v. Craft, 204 P.2d 1 (1949)(adopting the majority view
which nullifies consent in such cases); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C (1979)("If the conduct is made criminal in
order to protect a certain class of persons irrespective of their consent,
the consent of members of that class to the conduct is not effective to
bar a tort action.").
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liability. Some privileges, such as public 155 or private
necessity, 56 are conditional only. They do not cut off
liability. They merely permit defensive action. If the act
causes injury, the privilege-holder remains responsible for
the entire loss. Certainly, having this privilege is better
than having no privilege at all, but it is far less protective
than the defenses permitted in most other tort actions.
5. Procedural Advantages for Plaintiffs
All of the characteristics addressed so far are
substantive. They determine what an intentional tort
litigant must, may, or may not prove. However, the
procedural format of these torts is important as well. It
determines who has the burden of proof and how much
evidence he must produce. In each case, intentional tort
law is not even-handed. Instead, it stacks the deck of
procedural burdens to help plaintiffs and hinder defendants.
Thus, even though these torts speak the language of fault,
they actually operate on principles of strict liability.
Strict liability attempts to assist plaintiffs in obtaining
relief for their injuries. It does this by eliminating fault
155 Although the public necessity privilege is usually absolute, some
courts require public privilege -holders to pay compensation to their
victims. See Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 479 N.W.2d
38 (Minn. 1992)(holding a city liable to a homeowner for damage
caused during the attempted apprehension of a criminal suspect); see
also DOBBS, supra note 7, at 254 ("When the destroyed property
presented no dangers to others and would not have been destroyed
anyway, it is hard to see the difference between cases of "taking" for
which compensation must be paid and cases of public necessity (or
police power) for which no compensation is due.").
56 See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Or. 1984)(holding dock owner liable for damage
to a boat that was released out of private necessity); Vincent v. Lake
Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 191OXholding boat owner
liable for damage to a dock after the boat owner refused to release his
boat during a storm).
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from their causes of action, increasing the number of issues
assigned to defendants, and making those issues more
difficult to prove. This procedural scheme, however, is not
unique to the theory of strict liability. It is also evident in
almost all intentional torts. 157 In fact, it is permanently
ingrained in their elemental structure.
In an ordinary intentional tort case, the plaintiff has a
relatively easy burden of proof, and this burden is relatively
easy to satisfy. Unlike a negligence claimant, an
intentional tort plaintiff does not have to prove the
defendant owed him a duty of care. He also does not have
to identify or present evidence establishing the applicable
standard of care. Accordingly, she has no obligation to
prove the defendant breached any such standard. In some
cases, he may even be relieved of the burden of proving
damage. 158 Her only responsibilities are to show the
defendant acted with the intent to cause a forbidden
consequence, and as a result of such action, that
consequence occurred.
This burden is often negligible. For instance, in an
action for trespass to land, the plaintiff is required to show
only two things: (1) the defendant entered the premises and
(2) did so voluntarily and without consent. 159 These
elements of proof almost never call for expert testimony
but can be met merely by presenting the testimonies of lay
witnesses. While the defendant's subjective mental state
may be difficult to pin down, it normally can be gleaned
from a variety of sources, including the defendant's
157 Private (intentional) nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are possible exceptions. See supra note 144.
158 Assault, battery, false imprisonment, and trespass to land all permit
recovery of nominal damages in the absence of any actual loss. See
DOBBS, supra note 7, at 53, 64,75,95.
159 See id. at 95 ("One who intentionally enters or causes direct and
tangible entry upon the land in possession of another is a trespasser and
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testimony, the accounts of other witnesses, the surrounding
circumstances and the jury's own common sense.
Once the plaintiff has satisfied the elements of his cause
of action, the burden then shifts to the defendant to
establish some excuse or justification for his behavior.
Whether he relies on self-defense, defense of others,
protection of property, or necessity, the defendant
invariably will have to show that his conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances. 160 To meet this
burden, the defendant must prove she was privileged to
react to the situation as she did. 161 The proof required here
is very much like that is demanded of a negligence
plaintiff, only in reverse. More specifically, while a
negligence plaintiff must demonstrate fault, the intentional
tort defendant must disprove his fault or even justify his
actions.
Theoretical purists might argue that the existence of
such no-fault defenses is exactly what distinguishes
intentional torts from strict liability. However, this
argument does not hold true. Strict liability also permits
reasonableness "defenses," even if it is not particularly
candid about doing so.162 Sometimes the defense is openly
160 See id. at 156-57 (noting that all justifications tend to invoke
objective standards of reasonableness).
16 See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 124 ("The privilege extends to the
use of all reasonable force to prevent any threatened harmful or
offensive bodily contact, or any confinement, whether intended or
negligent. Since it originated as a defense, the burden is upon the
defendant to establish the facts creating the privilege.").
162 For example, in abnormally dangerous activity cases, the defendant
may argue that his activity, though dangerous, is highly useful for the
surrounding community, and thus is reasonable under the
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (f) &
cmt. k (1977); see also DOBBS, supra note 7, at 953 (noting that an
abnormally dangerous activity analysis "look[s] like a poorly disguised
negligence regime."). Likewise, in products liability actions involving
design or marketing defects, the defendant can offer cost-benefit or
risk-utility evidence to demonstrate that its product was reasonably
253
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accepted but its exculpatory effect is hidden. This occurs
safe. See id. at 985-87.
Products liability defendants often may assert a number of other,
verbally camouflaged, fault-based defenses. These defenses take the
following forms. The product design met the state of the art. See ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
403(1)(A) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 (West 1999); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2)
(Banks-Baldwin 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.764 (West 2000); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-01.4-04 (2001)
(aircraft); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-10.1 (Michie 1995). The
product was unforeseeably altered or modified after it was sold by the
defendant. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12- 683(2) (West 2003); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-116-106 (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
572(p) (West 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-6-5 (West 1999); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2947(1) (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3
(2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3 -03 (Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.915 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-32 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
20-9-10 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-108 (2000); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-5 (2002). The product complied with state or
federal statutes or regulations regarding design, testing, manufacture,
instructions, warnings, or labeling. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-
105(a) (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(l)(b) (2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.1256 (West Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 43-
20-5-1 (West 1999); KANSAS CODE ANN. § 60-3304 (Supp. 2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-01.3-09 (Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (2000); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.008 (Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050
(West 1992). The product complied with industry standards. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01.4-02(1) (Supp. 2003). The product was sold, with
adequate warnings, to a sophisticated user. See MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2947(4) (West 2000). The product contains a characteristic
that cannot be eliminated without compromising its function See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2947 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
99B-6(c) (2003). The product is inherently unsafe and this
characteristic is commonly known by consumers. See CAL CIV. CODE
§ 1714.45 (West Supp. 2004); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REV. CODE ANN. §
82.004 (Vernon 1997). The product contains an obvious risk that
should be recognized by consumers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5
(2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(d) (2000).
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when a strict liability action admits a comparative fault
defense. 163 Comparative fault is supposed to allow the
defendant to assign blame to others. However, by
comparing the actions of all parties to a lawsuit, it also
invites the jury to subconsciously assess the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct. 164
Even when reasonableness is not framed as a strict
liability defense, it often shows up as a limit to liability.
For example, strict products liability supposedly seeks to
determine whether products are defective, not whether their
manufacturers have acted reasonably. 165 Nevertheless, a
manufacturer often can escape liability merely by proving
that his product was not unreasonably dangerous 166 or by
163 Most jurisdictions now permit the assertion of a comparative fault
defense in strict products liability actions. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at
1021 ("[C]ourts and legislatures have now usually said that the
plaintiff's comparative negligence can be raised as an affirmative
defense and applied to reduce damages, both when the plaintiff asserted
negligence and when she asserted strict liability.").
164 After examining jury decision-making psychology in accident cases
generally, Neil Feignenson concluded that:
[w]hen people use their common sense to think about
responsibility for accidents, they tend to think in
simplified, personalized, moralized, and dichotomized
terms. In general, people prefer monocausal explanations
to multicausal ones;.. .people are prone to single out as
the cause of events the preceding conduct that is most
morally blameworthy; and people tend to divide their
simplified world of personal agency into good guys and
bad guys. In short, bad outcomes such as accidents are
attributed to bad behaviors, which are thought to emanate
from bad people; and if one bad person caused the
accident, then it follows from the principle of
monocausality that no one else did.
NEIL FEIGNENSON, LEGAL BLAME 14 (2000).
165 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 977-78.
"' See id. at 980-81 (noting that the unreasonable danger concept
invites an analysis evocative of negligence).
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showing that it lacked a reasonable alternative design. 167 It
seems, therefore, that despite all protestations to the
contrary, strict liability neither forbids exculpatory
arguments, nor forestalls the consideration of
reasonableness. In these respects, at least, it is virtually
indistinguishable from an intentional tort.
In the final analysis, the intentional tortfeasor, like the
strict liability actor, faces an uphill battle in the fight to
defend herself in court. The plaintiff may sustain his case
by proving just a few facts. The defendant then bears the
burden of disproving his responsibility. Should the
defendant fail to meet this burden, the defendant may be
found liable for the plaintiff's loss, even though his
intentions were pure and his actions sensibly suited to the
prevailing conditions. Innocence, without sufficient proof,
is simply no defense. If this is not the epitome of strict
liability, it is hard to imagine what is.
VI. Conclusion and Proposal
At the very least, this survey shows that things in
intentional tort law are not as they seem and certainly are
not as they are portrayed. Contrary to popular belief, many
intentional torts are not intentional at all. Conversely, some
torts that are intentional, at least under the legal definition
of that term, are not classified as intentional torts. Finally,
tortious intent, standing alone, never provides a sufficient
basis for holding someone liable. At best, it creates a
presumption of unreasonableness which initiates, but does
not necessarily resolve, the issue of fault.
These anomalies, in turn, permit an additional
167 See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of
Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
1183, 1243 (1992) ("Like the state of the art doctrine, the alternative
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observation. The current theoretical paradigm of tort law-
which separates torts into three mutually exclusive
categories--does not accurately describe the
interrelationship between intentional tort theory and the
theories of negligence and strict liability. Negligence and
intentional torts are not governed by different liability
standards. Instead, each is animated by the common
concept of reasonableness. Likewise, intentional torts and
strict liability do not fall on opposite ends of the liability
spectrum. Rather, they mostly overlap, with both theories
restricting entire activities, imposing expansive duties,
limiting defenses, and creating procedural advantages for
plaintiffs.
Placed in diagrammatic form, the structure of tort law
actually looks more like the image depicted in Figure 4.
Since all intentional torts are based on reasonableness, it
appears that they must be completely subsumed within a
theory grounded in that concept, whether we call that
theory "reasonableness," "negligence," or something else.
On the other hand, since all intentional torts impose a form
of strict liability, they too must be completely subsumed
within that theory as well. If one accepts the notion that
negligerce also contains some enclaves of strict liability-
such as negligence per se or res ipsa loquitur, among
others-this "overlap" matrix becomes complete.
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Figure 4: The "Overlap" Paradigm of Tort Law
From these observations, it is possible to draw one final
conclusion. To faithfully represent the actual relationship
among intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability, we
cannot retain the law's current tripartite structure. Instead,
we eventually will have to do at least some conceptual
reorganization. The paradigm offered in Figure 4 provides
just one nndel for effecting this change. However, this
model is not necessarily the only, or even the best,
candidate for the job.
If, as I have suggested, strict liability is not a
substantive concept restricted to a single theory of
recovery, but rather is a complex regimen of elements,
defenses, and procedural burdens that can be created in any
theory, then there may be no need to characterize it as an
independent tort. Moreover, if negligence's reasonableness
standard has the capacity to make its liability regimes
lenient or strict, a capacity which it has already
demonstrated, then that standard could do all of the
conceptual work now being done by the theory of strict
liability. Finally, if both of these assumptions are correct,
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then it would seem possible to integrate all torts into a
single paradigm of reasonableness-a progression that
actually carries the convergence principle evident in the
overlap paradigm to its logical extreme.
Although time and space limitations prevent extended
discussion here, 168 1 will close by suggesting what such a
"full integration" paradigm might look like. As depicted in
Figure 5, reasonableness would serve as the sole standard
for all torts. In most cases, the reasonableness paradigm
would impose a standard of ordinary care and would
implement an ordinary liability regime-much like a
garden-variety negligence case. 169 However, in certain
"special" cases-specifically those involving special actors,
activities, or relationships-the reasonableness paradigm
would adjust its standard up or down, create certain fixed
rules, and either relax or toughen its liability regime.
These special cases would fall into two different
classes, each forming a separate subset within the larger
reasonableness paradigm. The "Limited Liability" class
would cover actors, activities, and relationships that the law
already seeks to protect-including, for example, public
and quasi-public agents and entities, landowners, and
children-and would afford them substantive and
procedural advantages not available to those covered by the
168 I currently am working out the details of this paradigm, which I
intend to present in future scholarship.
169 Presumably, the plaintiff would have to prove the elements of duty,
breach, causation and damages. The duty element would include a duty
to act reasonably, but no duty to aid (unless a traditional exception
applied). The standard of care would be one of ordinary reasonable
care, to be determined by weighing the burden of precaution against the
risk of harm. The causation element would require proof of cause-in-
fact and proximate cause (or scope of liability). And the damage
element would require proof of a legally recognized loss. The
defendant, on the other hand, would be able to assert defenses of
comparative fault and assumption of risk.
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"ordinary" liability regime. 170 Conversely, the "Strict
Liability" class would cover actors, activities, and
relationships that currently receive more rigorous
treatment. This group would include not only traditional
strict liability subjects-like abnormally dangerous and
ultrahazardous activities, vicious and wild animals, and
defective products-but also defacto strict liability
subjects now covered by other tort theories-like children
engaged in "adult" activities, folks with mental disabilities,
statute violators, dominant partners in imbalanced (special)
relationships, and, most importantly for our purposes,
intentional tortfeasors. Depending on the subject, the law
would then expand its substantive requirements, reduce its
affirmative defenses, and/or intensify its procedural
burdens.
Figure 5: The "Full Integration" Paradigm of Tort Law
170 Because special harms-like emotional distress and pure economic
loss-arise episodically, they would not fall within the fixed Limited
Liability class, but could be used as a special circumstance in any class
to shape the appropriate liability scheme.
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Obviously, such a paradigm requires a lot more thought
and far greater explication. However, even at this inchoate
stage, it stands to eliminate many of the anomalies plaguing
current intentional tort jurisprudence. It openly recognizes
the reasonableness roots of all intentional torts. It continues
to treat intentional torts as a special category of wrongs. It
retains the strict liability approach now hidden behind the
law's terminology. But perhaps most importantly, it melds
these ideas in a way that is theoretically consistent,
conceptually accurate, and intellectually honest.
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Policy Changes Needed in the Federal Rules of Evidence
Donald Paine*
Let's start with how federal sausage is made. Recently,
I read that the chief policymaking body supervising rule
drafting has 26 federal judges and no practicing lawyers.
None. The committees voting on revisions have few
practitioners and many judges, professors, and government
employees. The legal geniuses in Congress made
significant revisions in the evidence package sent over from
the Court in 1972, delaying the effective date until January
2, 1975. It's little wonder that the Federal Rules of
Evidence need changing. Here are some suggestions.
Rule 103(a)(2) should require the lawyers making an
offer of proof to state the specific evidence principle
justifying the offer. Part (a)(1) contains such a requirement
for objections.
Should Rule 404(b) be amended to specify whether
"person" applies only to the accused in a criminal trial?
The Circuits are split, as outlined in the recent Sixth Circuit
decision, United States v. Lucas.1 If the other crimes
exclusion is limited to accused defendants, then defense
counsel is free to prove criminal conduct of other suspects
to prove character conforming conduct tending to exonerate
the accused client. Also, civil trials would not be covered
by the exclusionary rule. "Person" would seem to include
folks other than the accused, but either a rule change or a
Supreme Court ruling is needed.
Whether a claim is "disputed" under Rule 408 at the
time of a compromise offer is unclear. If I am in a car
* The author is a Knoxville lawyer who teaches Evidence each fall at
the University of Tennessee College of Law. He served as President of
the Tennessee Bar Association and has been elected to membership in
the American College of Trial Lawyers.
'357 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004).
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wreck and offer to settle on the spot, is the claim disputed?
There probably will be threats and a lawsuit later. Why
should the policy to ban evidence of settlement offers not
apply to my situation?
Meet the Honorable Susan Molinari and her pet Rules
413, 414, and 415.2 When she was in Congress, her vote
was sorely needed on some languishing legislation. In
exchange for that vote, Molinari required the passage of
rules allowing unconditional admissibility of other crimes
to prove character and conforming conduct in criminal and
civil trials involving sexual assault or child molestation.
Her silly rules became the federal law of the land. Note,
sausage lovers, that the Supreme Court had no involvement
whatsoever. A delicious critique can be found in 159
F.R.D. 95 (1994). Luckily most of these criminal
prosecutions are brought in state courts, but Rule 415
affects many federal and civil trials.
Rule 606(b) could use some work. Assume the jury is
hung on liability or guilt. A juror suggests a coin toss to
break the deadlock, and all agree. The choice is heads for
the plaintiff and tails for the defendant, or heads for the
United States and tails for the accused. Despite wringing
of academic hands in treatises and law review articles, the
trial judge is forbidden to even consider juror testimony or
affidavits at a motion for new trial hearing. The rule bars
inquiry into "any matter... occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations." The same would apply if a civil
jury hung on damages reached a quotient verdict as a
compromise.
There's not much wrong with Rule 609(a) as written,
although it's poorly drafted, but the Supreme Court wrote
two ridiculous opinions that need reversal through a
redrafted rule. In Luce v. United States, the United States
2 Susan Molinari was a Member of Congress representing New York
from 1990 to 1997.
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Supreme Court held that an accused who does not take the
witness stand has no appellate standing to complain of a
trial judge's flat out wrong in limine ruling that a
conviction is admissible to impeach. 3 So post-Luce I
should put my willing client on the stand and bring out the
erroneous impeaching conviction on direct to soften the
blow, right? Nope, said the Court in Ohler v. United
States.4 I must let the government introduce the conviction
on cross; otherwise I have no standing to complain on
appeal.
Speaking of the dearth of trial lawyers on federal rules
committees, compare the brief time in the legal trenches of
Supreme Court justices. A colleague of mine places the
average at around seven years in real law practice. Reckon
I was qualified for the highest bench after only seven years
of combat? Not hardly.
Why should the scope of cross-examination be limited
to issues raised on direct, as required by Rule 611 (b)? The
cross-examiner can later call the witness at the next stage of
proof, although that may cause problems via witness
hostility. But a witness with knowledge of facts relevant to
material issues should be required on cross to tell the jury
about them then and there.
Rule 612 is not even a rule of evidence, but rather a
discovery rule. It needs radical redrafting to codify the
common law technique for refreshing recollection.
Moreover, the provision permitting court-ordered
production of a document shown the witness "before
testifying" is unfair. If a Rule of Civil or Criminal
Procedure permits discovery, so be it, but remove this
language from the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Of all the policy decisions made by the judicial and
legislative drafters, the most wrongheaded was to classify
3 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984).
4 529 U.S. 753 (2000).
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some hearsay statements as "not hearsay." The following
are listed in Rule 801(d):
* inconsistent statements sworn to at a hearing,
* consistent statements not to rehabilitate,
* statements of identification,
* opposing party admissions.
Each of these fits the definition of hearsay in Rule 801 (c):
"...a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." So why call hearsay
"not hearsay"? The sainted Irving Younger was probably
correct in guessing that the drafters wanted the world to
know they read Wigmore, who argued that admissions
don't trigger hearsay dangers.5 How precious. These
exceptions should be moved to Rule 803.
Lingering on admissions a moment longer, consider
Rule 801 (d)(2)(D) on statements by agents and "servants."
For these to be trustworthy offers against the
party/principal, the assertion should be against the agent's
interest. Statements by employees that drip with self-
serving motive and cast blame on coworkers or the boss
should be excluded as untrustworthy. They come marching
in, however, under the only two rule requirements:
existence of the agency relationship and subject matter
within the scope of agency.
Before we leave "not hearsay," let us compare Rules
803(7) and 803(10) with Rule 801(d). These exceptions
cover the absence of an entry in a business record of public
record to prove that an alleged fact never existed. But how
is the absence of a statement a "statement" under the




FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
hearsay definition? It is not, and these two bogus
"exceptions" should be eliminated.
Rule 803(1) contains an unnecessary untrustworthy
exception for statements of present sense impression. The
declarant describes an event while perceiving it "or
immediately thereafter." Until 1975, only Texas bought
into this theory through Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,
6
which was once in all evidence casebooks. There Sally
Cooper was heard to say as a Plymouth sped past her on the
highway: "They must be drunk; we'll find them
somewhere on the road wrecked if they keep that rate of
speed up."'7 The two passengers who heard the words
testified. Sally also testified. Aside from the dubious
relevance, there was utterly no need for the hearsay, as
jurors had the nonhearsay testimony of three witnesses
concerning speed. But the court held reports of "present-
sense impression" should be admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule. Academics loved the holding and added
this ingredient to federal sausage.
Subparts (B) and (C) of Rule 803(8) are in need of
tinkering or elimination. Statements in public records are
admissible to prove matters where a public official had a
legal duty to observe and report. So far so good. Then
there is an exception in (B) for criminal cases, where
reports containing rmtters observed by police and "other
law enforcement personnel" are inadmissible hearsay.
Why should those same reports be admissible in a civil
trial? If they are untrustworthy in criminal trials, they are
untrustworthy, period.
Rule 803(8)(C) has been construed to apply to official
investigative findings that are far from "factual." Beech
Aircraft Corporation v. Rainey8 held admissible a JAG
report opining that the cause of a Navy plane crash was
6 161 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1942).
7 Id. at 476.
'488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988).
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pilot error. Surely the plaintiff, widower of the allegedly
negligent pilot, would like an opportunity to cross-examine.
Even purely "factual" findings of government flunkies are
often based on multiple hearsay from declarants not under
an official duty to report truthfully. This part of Rule 803
should be deleted. If it is kept, it should be amended to
conform to Beech Aircraft.
The common law limited the ancient documents
exception to statements in 30-year-old property documents.
Not so in Rule 803(16). Now any document, not just a
property document, that is at least 20 years old can be
introduced to prove the truth of statements therein. That is
loony. Take the pre-Jayson Blair rag of record way back
on January 2, 1894, two years before Adolph Ochs rescued
it from the brink of bankruptcy. The headline on page 1
screamed, "Hillmon Tells His Story: The Murderer Found
in the Mountains of Utah." That false statement would be
admissible as true in a federal trial 110 years later. If
getting to the truth depends on the accuracy of such a world
class joke as The New York Times, heaven help us.
A frequently used ground of unavailability is that the
declarant's trial attendance cannot be procured by a
summons. Rule 804(a)(5) contains a silly difference for
three exceptions, primarily the declaration against interest
exception. In order for us to introduce a statement against
interest, we must demonstrate that we were unable to
subpoena the declarant for trial or to depose the declarant
("the declarant's attendance or testimony"). Since we can
depose folks nationwide in federal suits, the two-pronged
requirement eliminates this type of unavailability for the
exception unless the declarant simply can't be located.
That's why virtually all federal precedents involve
declarations against interest by declarants who invoked the
first unavailability ground by taking the Fifth.
Language in Rule 804(b)(1) defining former testimony
allows a civil litigant to introduce a transcript against a
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party who was not present at the prior hearing if a
predecessor in interest was present. Some circuit courts
have construed "predecessor in interest" to include anyone
who had a similar motive to examine the declarant. An
example of this construction is found in one of my
appellate losses, Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.9 Such
a holding ignores both the language in the Rule and the
legislative history. As Justice Thomas emphasized in
United States v. Salerno,0 courts are not at liberty to ignore
what a rule plainly states. The person or entity at the
former hearing must indeed be a predecessor in interest and
must have had both an opportunity and a similar motive to
examine the declarant. Clay is therefore no longer good
law, but the predecessor in interest garbage should still be
thrown out.
Finally, we have the residual exception in Rule 807. It
allows federal judges to let in hearsay that goes beyond
even the goofy exceptions discussed above. This rule
should be stricken from the books. While it does exist,
however, the objecting lawyer should remind liberal jurists
that the final sentence conditions the use of this exception
on pretrial notice of intention to offer the statement, the
"particulars" of the statement, and name and address of the
declarant. Consequently, it is illegal to use this exception
as a last-minute fallback position.
Federal practice would be a better world if all or most
of the changes suggested above were made. Do I think that
will happen? Not unless the manufacturing process for
sausage is radically altered. It won't be. Too many egos
would get hurt.
9 722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983).





University of Tennessee Pro Bono*
The Honorable E. Riley Anderson*"
Dean Galligan, 1 thank you for that overly generous
introduction and for the honor of allowing me to speak at
this reception celebrating the tenth anniversary of the
University of Tennessee's Pro Bono program. But most of
all, thank you for your strong leadership of this excellent
law school.
I want to begin by recognizing the truly outstanding
work performed by U.T. Pro Bono over its ten years of
existence under the forceful and energetic leadership of
Doug Blaze 2 and the more recent able assistance of April
Hart3 as student director; and to talk about the critical
importance of providing legal services and representation
to the poor and the disadvantaged.
"U.T. Pro Bono is a student-directed community service organization
at the University of Tennessee College of Law. It was founded in
1994. The reception was held April 1, 2004 in Knoxville, Tennessee.
E. Riley Anderson is a Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court. In
addition to his numerous honors, Justice Anderson received the
Tennessee Bar Association's William M. Leech, Jr. Public Service
Award in 2001. He is a graduate of the University of Tennessee
College of Law.
I Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. is the Dean and Elvin E. Overton
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College
of Law.
2 Douglas A. Blaze is the Art Stolnitz and Elvin E. Overton
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College
of Law. Professor Blaze is also Director of Advocacy and Clinical
Programs.
3 April Hart is a 2004 graduate of the University of Tennessee College
of Law. While a law student, Ms. Hart directed the U.T. Pro Bono
program.
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In the last ten years, U.T. Pro Bono has become an
invaluable and irreplaceable part of our legal landscape. It
has helped more than 2,000 low-income citizens in East
Tennessee to receive legal services that would not have
been available. It has provided that legal representation
while also providing valuable training and experience
annually for approximately 150 future members of the legal
profession. Indeed, U.T. Pro Bono has become a model for
providing legal services to low-income citizens and a
reminder of the vital importance of promoting pro bono
services.
The idea of pro bono publico - "free legal services to
the poor" - dates back to early English jurisprudence and
has for centuries distinguished the legal profession from all
others. As Dean Roscoe Pound said some 60 years ago,
"Historically, there are three essential ideas involved in a
profession - organization, learning, and a spirit of public
service. These are essential. The remaining idea, that of
gaining a livelihood, is incidental. ' 4
The importance our profession continues to place on
providing services to the poor and the disadvantaged has
become a fundamental principle grounded in our ethical
rules. The comments to ABA Model Rule 6.1, which was
adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 2002, 5 state:
"Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or
professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal
services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement
in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the
most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer."
6
4 Roscoe Pound, What is Profession?, 19 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 203,
204 (1944) (emphasis added).
5 See TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. (2004).




This extraordinary University of Tennessee Pro Bono
program which is guided by these principles, has become
even more important because of a number of negative
trends which affect access to justice:
First, Congress recognized in the Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1964 that there was a need to provide
equal access to justice; and that to preserve its strength, the
program had to be free from the influence of political
pressure, and attorneys must have full freedom to protect
the best interests of their clients. 7
From that highly principled beginning, we all are aware
of the continuing battle in Congress year after year over
restrictions on the program and constant cuts in funding.
The local result in federally funded legal services programs
is that only five percent of the needy are served and that
priority must be placed on survival issues-i.e. health,
housing, income, and safety.
Second, the Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services,
8
chaired by Dean Galligan, recently surveyed the needs of
the state's one million poor (18 percent of our population of
5.7 million) and identifies the key issue as a difficult policy
choice of who to serve since so many cannot be served.9
Third, in the pro bono hey-day of the 1980s and 1990s,
law students were encouraged to ask employers about their
contribution to pro bono. When the economy faltered,
competition turned fierce and the dynamic changed in
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2004).
8 "The Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services (TALS) is a statewide
non-profit organization that seeks to build partnerships to support the
delivery of effective civil legal services for low income and elderly
Tennesseans." See http://www.tals.org/PublicWeb/About/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2005).
9 See TENN. ALLIANCE FOR LEGAL SERV., THE TENNESSEE STATE PLAN
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many big law firms to limiting pro bono time and types of
cases (no more environmental protection, reproductive or
prayer cases, among others).
Fourth, bar-sponsored pro bono programs are excellent,
but despite our best effort, the rate of participation is low.
As of 2003, the rate in our metropolitan counties is as
follows:







It is arguably lower in more rural counties with less
organized programs.
To respond to the problem, the conference of chief
justices in the late 1990s recommended judicial
involvement in promoting pro bono delivery of civil legal
services. As a result, a number of states have revised their
ethical rules to specify the amount of recommended pro
bono service. The Florida Supreme Court has gone further
and ordered mandatory pro bono reporting, which has been
controversial, but effective - attorney participation
increased by 36 percent. The Tennessee Supreme Court
actively encourages participation through outreach
programs. It has considered mandatory reporting, but
rejected it on the basis that pro bono work is an ethical duty
and we expect attorneys to fulfill their duty without
compulsion.
10 See Terry Woods, How the Knoxville Bar Stacks Up, DICTA, Feb.




Our history has shown that a commitment to pro bono
and public service is essential in our quest for justice and
equality. Our state and federal constitutions promise due
process, fairness, and equal treatment under the law for all.
There are no exceptions and no conditions in these words.
As Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in dissent years ago
in Plessy v. Ferguson,I" "[I]n the eye of the law there is, in
this country, no superior or dominant ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind. All citizens are equal before the law. The humblest
is the peer of the most powerful under the law."' 2
Our history also demonstrates, however, that the goal of
equal justice under law is attainable only when all citizens
are provided equal access. Ensuring that everyone has that
vital access is the very essence of pro bono and public
service.
As a profession and as a society, we should be
measured by how we treat the downtrodden and the
disadvantaged among us. As Winston Churchill is often
quoted as saying, "We make a living by what we get, and
we make a life by what we give."
That is why it is important to recognize and
congratulate U.T. Pro Bono for its exceptional
accomplishments as it marks its tenth anniversary. We
must all follow the example set by U.T. Pro Bono and
renew our commitment to public service and to the
fulfillment of the promises of equal justice under law.
I look forward to a time when exceptional programs
such as U.T. Pro Bono are expanded, and to a time when
legal services programs are fully and liberally funded, and
to a time when criminal defense appointments are fully
funded, and to a time when all lawyers will dedicate more
" 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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time to the service of the poor, and to a time when
everyone will have full access to the courts. And it is only
when that time comes that we will truly achieve the
promise of equal justice under law.
Thank you
100
UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
NOTE
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act:
Addressing Moral Intuition and the Right to Choose
Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
Amid heated political rhetoric from both sides of the
abortion debate, President Bush signed the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act ("the Act")1 into law on April 1, 2004.2
The Act, also referred to as "Laci and Connor's Law,"
3
makes the killing of a fetus during the commission of
certain Federal crimes a separate offense punishable in
varying degrees. 4 Pro-life campaigners maintain that the
Act is necessary to reduce the ever-increasing numbers of
violent attacks against pregnant women. 5 Pro-choice
advocates, on the other hand, argue that the Act is nothing
more than an attempt to "erode the foundations of the right
to choose as recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade."
6
In analyzing the ramifications of the Act, both critics
and advocates are quick to bring abortion into the
discussion. However, given the explicit language of the
statute and its legislative history, appealing to abortion is an
Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
1841).
See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., Key Facts on the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/keypointsuvva.html (last updated
Apr. 1, 2004).
3 In memory of Laci Peterson and her unborn child, Connor, who
disappeared Christmas Eve, 2002. Ms. Peterson and Connor were later
found dead. See H.R. REP. No. 108-420 pt. 1, at 8, reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,538.
4 See Unborn Victims of Violence Act, § 2(a).
5 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 4.
6 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 81; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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unnecessary, unsupported step. It is a misunderstanding of
the Act for either side of the abortion debate to use the
Act's language as a tool to advance any position on
abortion or fetal rights. Despite an express exception to
cases of medically legal abortion7, many continue to attack
the Act because they feel that the Act infringes dangerously
on the constitutionally guaranteed right to choose.
Although an overwhelming majority of Americans
polled expressed support for a fetal crime law,8 abortion
rights groups have propounded four main arguments in
their opposition to the Act.9 First, they argue that the Act's
lack of a mens rea requirement violates principles of due
process. Second, they claim the Act will lead to extensive
litigation concerning the fetus. Third, they argue the Act
does not address the crimes against pregnant women, which
it set out to remedy. Finally, abortion rights groups argue
that the Act is an attack on a woman's right to choose. 10
This note defends the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
in an attempt to reconcile the need for a fetal homicide law
with a woman's constitutionally protected right to choose.
The analysis addresses each of the four above-mentioned
arguments and demonstrates why each is without merit. A
fetal homicide law is not inconsistent with the principles set
forth in Roe v. Wade1 1 concerning a woman's right to
choose.
At common law, the "born alive" rule governed
7 See H.R. RE'. No. 108-420, at 4.
8 Michael Holzapfel, Comment, The Right to Live, The Right to
Choose, and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 431,436 (2002)stating 2001 poll revealed 90
percent of Americans would support a fetal crime law).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 81-88.
10 Id.
"' 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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conviction for the death of an unborn child. 12 This rule was
articulated by Sir Edward Coke, who wrote:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a
potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe; or if
a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this
is a great misprision, and no murder; but if the
childe be borne alive and dieth of the potion,
battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in the
law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in
rerum natura, when it is born alive.
13
Thus, under this rule, one who caused the death of an
unborn fetus was punished only if the fetus was born alive
and later died from the injuries sustained while in the
womb. 14 The punishment for this offense was the same as
the punishment for killing another person. 15 The killing of
a quickened fetus before birth, however, was considered
only a "great misprision," or misdemeanor, while the
killing of a fetus before quickening was not a punishable
offense at all.
16
Over time, state legislatures began changing their laws
on fetal homicide in response to what many viewed as
moral deficiencies in current homicide statutes. Perhaps
the most famous instance of this phenomenon was the
California legislature's response to Keeler v. Superior
12 Hilary A. Converse, Note, The Fetal Homicide Fallacy: A
Comparison of California's Inconsistent Statutes to Other States, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 451,453 (2003).
13 Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 443 (quoting E. COKE, THE THIRD PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1628)).
14 Converse, supra note 12, at 453.
15 Id.
16 Alan S. Wasserstrom, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child,
64 A.L.R. 5TH 671, 686 (2004) (stating that quickening was generally
held to occur between the sixth and eighth week of pregnancy).
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Court. 17 Keeler became enraged after discovering that his
ex-wife was pregnant by another man. 18 Keeler followed
his ex-wife on a mountain road, blocked her vehicle, and
told her to get out of her car. 19 He told her he knew she
was pregnant, and after looking at her stomach, became
visibly upset. 20 Referring to the unborn child, Keeler said
he was going to "stomp it out of [her]." 21 He then pushed
her against her car, kneed her in the abdomen, and hit her in
the face several times.22
The fetus was delivered stillborn via Caesarian section;
it had severe skull fractures and was devoid of air in the
lungs.23 A doctor testified with reasonable medical
certainty that the fetus had reached the stage of viability.24
Keeler was charged with the murder of the fetus; however,
at that time the California homicide statute required the
"unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought., 25 The court held that, because the California
legislature's definition of murder applied only to those who
were born alive,26 Keeler could not be convicted for the
murder of the fetus. Such a conviction, the court reasoned,
would deny Keeler's due process rights since it would
require a construction of the homicide statute which Keeler
did not anticipate.27
In response to Keeler, the California legislature
amended its homicide statute to include the killing of a








25 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 187).
26Id. at 622.
27 Id. at 630.
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fetus.28 Since Keeler, other states addressed similar cases
of intentional fetal homicide, and many of them responded
with similar statutory amendments.29 Currently, 31 states
have homicide laws that make it a crime to kill a fetus.3 °
Eighteen of these states punish the killing of a fetus at any
prenatal stage of development; however, 12 of these states
recognize the fetus as a victim only after a certain stage of
prenatal development. 31 The prenatal stage at which the
fetus is recognized as a victim varies by state. Of the 19
states that do not have fetal homicide statutes, 13 adhere to
the common law "born alive" rule.32 The remaining six
28 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2004).
29 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., A Votefor the Lofgren "One- Victim"
Substitute is a Vote Against Protectionfor Unborn Victims of Violence,
available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/ShiwonaPaceStandard.pdf
(statemnt by Shiwana Pace discussing how she was attacked by hit-
men hired by her ex-boyfriend to kill her unborn baby. As she was
being beaten, the attackers said to her, "Your baby is dying tonight."
An Arkansas court convicted the ex-boyfiend of murdering the baby
based on a state law enacted just one month earlier).
30 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html
(listing 31 states with laws which recognize the killing of a fetus, at
varying stages of development, as homicide: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, & Wisconsin).
31 id.
32 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-1(2) (1994); Alaska Stat.§ 11.41.140 (Michie
22000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-101(2) (32001); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann.§ 53(a)-3(l) (West 2001); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-700
(Michie 1999 & Supp. 2001); Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 1-
101(h) (year) Code, art. 27 407 (1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tTit. 17-A,
§§ 2(20), 201 (West 1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(28) (2001);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-14(g), :11-2 (West 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
17 (1999); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.005(3) (1999); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
5301(4) (Supp. 1998); W. Va. Code § 61-2-1 (1997).
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states follow the "born alive" rule, but still criminalize
actions that cause injury or death to a fetus. 33 This rule has
been referred to as the "born alive with a caveat" rule.
34
States in this category avoid the question of whether a fetus
can be classified as a separate victim by punishing, as a
crime against the mother, the act of injuring or killing her
fetus.
35
Until passage of the Act, federal criminal law followed
the common law "born alive" rule.36 In an effort to keep
federal law on pace with quickly evolving state laws by
following the legal trend of "dismantling the common law
born alive rule,, 37 Representative Melissa Hart38 proposed
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. The argument for
passing the Act is congruent with the rationale behind the
adoption of similar laws by 31 state legislatures. Moral
intuition seems to suggest that the killing of a fetus, when
done maliciously and without the mother's permission,
should not go unpunished merely because the fetus is not
"born alive.
' 3 9
Five years after it was first introduced, the bill was
signed into law, to recognize fetuses as separate and
distinct victims of crime for the first time under federal
33 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(22) (Supp. 19992002); Iowa Code
Ann.§ 707.8 (West Supp. 2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3440,21-3441
(1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 631:1(I)(c), 631:2(I)(e) (1999); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
502(a)(iv) (Michie 1999).
34 Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 457 (creating a category for states who do
not have fetal homicide laws, but punish the act of killing a fetus as a
crime against the mother).
35 id
36 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 5.
31 Id. at 5-6.
38 Melissa Hart is a Member of Congress representing the 4
th
Congressional District of Pennsylvania. She sponsored the proposed
Unborn Victims of Violence Act in the U.S. House of Representatives.
39 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 8-13.
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law.4° On April 1, 2004, H.R. 1997 became Public Law
108-212.41 Following passage of the Act, the killing or
injuring of a fetus, under certain circumstances, became
punishable as a federal crime. In so doing, Congress also
filled the void in the 19 states that do not have state laws
recognizing a fetus as a potential homicide victim. Feticide
also became a crime in federal jurisdictions-such as the
military-that previously adhered to the "born alive" rule.
42
As mentioned above, the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act aligns federal law with the homicide statutes of 31
states. 43 The law amends the United States Code and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to make it a federal crime
to cause the injury or death of a fetus during the
commission of any of 68 enumerated federal offenses.44
While the Act filled what many viewed as a moral void,
its passage stirred up issues within the broader abortion
debate. Pro-choice and pro-life advocates agreed that the
Act as a small step towards attacking the legality of
40 Id. at 434. In fact, two Congressional sessions passed before the Act
began to move through the House of Representatives. Id. at 437-38.
41 Nat'l Right to Life Comm., supra note 2, available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbomVictims/keypointsuvva.html.
42 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 1 -4.
43 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., supra note 30.
41 118 Stat. 568 § 1841. Ifa fetus is killed during the commission of
one or more of sixty-eight enumerated Federal crimes, criminal
homicide liability for the death of the fetus may attach to the actor.
Among the more common of those specifically listed sixty-eight crimes
are: drug related drive by shootings, 18 U.S.C.A. § 36; deprivation of
Constitutional rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C.A. § 242; possession
of firearms or dangerous weapons in a Federal facility, 18 U.S.C.A. §
930; murder, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111; manslaughter, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1112;
attempted murder, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1113; kidnapping, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1201; bank robbery, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113; aggravated sexual abuse, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2241; section 408(e) of the Controlled Substance Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. 848(e); and section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. 2283.
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abortion.45 Ultimately, however, each side is mistaken as
to the legal and moral effects the Act will have on abortion
rights.
In an attempt to protect constitutional rights guaranteed
in both the Fourteenth Amendment46 and under Roe v.
Wade,47 pro-choice supporters presented various arguments
to reveal what they feel are inadequacies and legal flaws
within the Act.48 While both the constitutional and
practical arguments attacking the Act are without merit,
such arguments are nonetheless unnecessary because the
Act suggests nothing about the nature of the fetus that
would make the Act inconsistent with current abortion
rights.
I. Due Process Implications
Opponents of the Act argue that the lack of a mens rea
requirement renders it unconstitutional. 49 Because the Act
requires neither knowledge of a woman's pregnancy nor
intent to cause injury or death to a fetus, opponents argue
that an accused's due process rights are violated because
there is no criminal intent element and no knowledge of
whether one is actually committing a violation of the Act. 50
Supporters of the Act look to the familiar criminal law
doctrine of transferred intent, which, they argue, saves the
constitutionality of the Act by supplying the requisite mens
45 Id.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
4' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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rea element.5' Under this approach, if one intends to injure
person A, but instead injures person B, the actor can be
punished for the crime against person B even though he had
no intention to harm person B. The intent to injure person
A transfers to person B. Thus, the actor can be punished
for committing a crime against a person who was never an
intended victim.
The theory, as applied to a fetus, is that the intent to
commit one or more of the 68 enumerated federal crimes
upon anyone transfers to the fetus of an expectant mother.
52
Under this transferred intent analysis, the appropriate mens
rea exists to convict a person for injuring or killing a fetus
without a violation of the perpetrator's due process rights.
Opponents argue that transferred intent fails to remedy
the due process issues in the Act because such intent can be
transferred only to another person, thus a fetus would be
given the classification of a distinct victim of homicide.53
But this is precisely what the Act does - it legally
recognizes the fetus as an independent victim of crime. 54
To argue that transferred intent does not apply to the Act
ignores the fact that the Act was to make transferred intent
to apply to a fetus.
Opponents also argue that transferred intent applies
only to a "person;" but classifying a fetus as a "person" is
inconsistent with Roe v. Wade.55 Again, this argument
misses an important linguistic point. If the language of a
homicide statute is properly worded, there is no reason that
transferred intent could not apply to a person and a fetus as
51 id.
2H.R. REP. No. 108-420 (stating that transferred intent was recognized
at common law as early as the 16"e century).
53 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 85 (2004), reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,559.108-420.
54 Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 434.
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a separate category. This would prevent the need to force a
"fetus" into the classification of "person." For instance, a
statute could be worded, "Murder is the intentional killing
of another person or fetus with malice aforethought. If one
intends to kill another person with malice aforethought and,
in the commission of that act, kills a fetus, such malicious
intent will transfer from the intended other person to the
fetus."
While this is not how most current homicide statutes
are worded, there is nothing to prevent a future homicide
statute from being so worded. In fact, this is exactly what
the Act did. Given the current shift in fetal homicide laws
from the old common law "born alive" rule towards the
recognition of a fetus as a victim, crafting such a statute
would not only be permissible, it would be logically
consistent with the current jurisprudential shift.
However, invoking the doctrine of transferred intent
may not be necessary. The framework for convicting such
actors already exists under many homicide statutes without
recourse to transferred intent. For example, many homicide
statutes follow some variation of the common law
definition of murder as "the intentional killing of another
with malice aforethought., 56 Thus, if one has "malice
aforethought" and intentionally kills another, he has
committed murder. The language of such statutes does not
require the actor to maliciously intend to kill the person
who is actually killed. This language only requires that the
actor maliciously intend to kill someone, and that someone
be killed during the actus reus of the crime. The person
killed need not be the object of the malicious intent. Thus,
a linguistic analysis of many homicide statutes makes
transferred intent an unnecessary tool.
56 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (West 1999) stating that "murder
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Furthermore, the lack of mens rea is not necessarily
crucial since criminal law recognizes strict liability
offenses. For example, most states' statutory rape laws
make it a crime to engage in sexual acts with someone
under the age of consent, regardless of whether the
perpetrator actually knows the victim's age.57 The fact that
a person can commit one of the sixty-eight enumerated
offenses within the Act without ever knowing that he or she
is committing a second crime bears great similarity to
conviction under a statutory rape law.
58
For example, a 19-year-old man can be convicted for
having sex with a 14-year-old girl, even though the man
had no intention of committing statutory rape. In fact, even
if the girl told the man that she was 18, he could still be
convicted. Analogously, a man can be convicted for killing
a fetus, even though he had no intention of committing fetal
homicide. If mistake of fact and mistake of law are no
defense to strict liability offenses such as statutory rape,
then why not interpret fetal homicide laws as strict liability
offenses as well. Not only would this negate the need for a
mens rea requirement, but given the harsh punishment that
could attach without any intent to injure the fetus, it would
greatly advance the underlying purpose of the Act - to
prevent violent attacks against women. Most men are
cognizant of statutory rape laws, and the fear of such
prosecutions often provides the basis for refraining from
sex with a partner of questionable age. Many men may
also fear a fetal homicide law, and would thus refrain from
carrying out violent acts against women.
In short, the lack of a mens rea requirement is not fatal
to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. In fact, from a
criminal law standpoint, it is far less of an issue than the
Act's opponents allege. The argument that the Act is
57 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506 (West 2000).
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unconstitutional because it violates due process rights is
simply not compelling.
II. Potential for Excessive Litigation
Opponents of the Act also argue that it will open the
door to a flood of litigation concerning the nature and rights
of the fetus.59 One of the main arguments is that the Act
confers upon a fetus legal rights equivalent to those of the
mother, and litigation over those rights could result in fetal
rights surpassing those of the mother. 60 This trumping of
women's rights, they fear, could one day lead to a system
in which legally responsible, mentally intact women are
civilly committed for no other reason than to protect the
rights of a fetus. 61 There is no indication that courts are
ready to deprive women of their Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights in order to protect a fetus.
First, nothing in the Act attempts to confer upon a fetus
rights equal to those of the mother. While the Act may
confer some rights upon a fetus, it does not, nor could it,
confer rights equal to that of the mother without violating
Roe v. Wade. Thus, while the mother's rights may, at some
point, come into conflict with the rights of the fetus, Roe v.
Wade has already mandated that the mother's rights
prevail, and Roe is controlling precedent. 62 The Act does,
591 d. at 86.
60 id.
61 Id. (arguing that "[a] future statute might require a woman to be
prosecuted for any act or 'error' in judgment during her term, for her
consumption of wine or cigarettes, or for her decision to fly during
pregnancy. When expanded to cover fetuses, child custody provisions
may be used as a basis for allowing a biological father awarded custody
of the fetus to control the women's behavior, or in some cases, civilly
commit pregnant women to protect their fetuses.").
62 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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however, confer upon a fetus the right not to be injured or
killed without the mother's consent. 63
Second, many argue that the judiciary could view the
rights of a fetus as so important that they must protect them
under every circumstance. The fact is, however, that if the
justice system should ever reach the point where judges, at
the request of a biological father, civilly commit an
otherwise sane woman in order to protect her fetus, then
our legal system will have far more serious issues than the
legal status of a fetus. If that day should ever arrive, the
Constitution and the freedoms it once granted will be in
desperate need of resurrection. 64
Thus, the argument that fetal rights will one day trump
mothers' rights relies on a misinterpretation of the rights
conferred upon a fetus by the Act. In addition, proponents
of the argument paint an irrational, worst-case scenario
picture of the justice system, which makes the argument
entirely unconvincing. For theoretical purposes, one may
argue that, if a fetus is given any protections, our
Constitutional system of justice will decline to a point
where judges imprison women in violation of due process -
a degeneration to a 16 th Century English royal prerogative
without support in and contrary to established law.
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 1841. (2004).
64 Having said that, opponents point to two cases as examples of this
kind ofjudicial overreaching. In the first, a federal case, a judge
ordered a pregnant woman refusing medical care because of her
religious convictions into custody in an attempt to ensure that the baby
be safely born. In the second, a judge sent a student to prison to
prevent her from obtaining a midterm abortion. See H.R. REP. No.
108-420, pt. 1, at 87, n.27 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,
560 (citations omitted). While these instances are disturbing, they
should be addressed as violations of the tenets of Roe v. Wade as well
as Due Process. It should also be noted that these instances occurred
prior to the passage of the Act, meaning that these cases were in no way
affected by the new law. If this type of occurrence is a problem, it is
one that pre-dated the Act and, thus, cannot be said to have been a
product of the Act.
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However, for practical purposes, this argument is based on
fallacy. It reveals a grossly pessimistic view of American
criminal procedure. Further, it ignores an important point -
that the Act was not created for the purpose of endowing
rights upon a fetus, it was created for the purpose of
protecting pregnant women who want to carry their fetuses
to full term birth. Given that endowing the fetus with rights
is not the purpose of the Act, there is no reason to assume
that, if fetal rights ever conflict with a mother's rights, Roe
will not be followed.
III. Failure to Address Violence Against Women
Opponents of the Act next argue that it does not address
the problem it was intended to cure. 65 The Act was
designed in response to the ever-increasing occurrences of
violence against pregnant women. 66 However, opponents
argue that the Act "[flails to recognize that an injury to a
fetus is first and foremost an injury to the woman."
67
Specifically, they argue that the Act "[flails to address the
vast number of domestic violence acts perpetrated against
women and prosecuted under state statutes., 68 Thus,
according to those opposing a federal fetal homicide law,
the Act altogether fails in its attempt to address or reduce
the problem it was created to remedy.
This argument's primary flaw is its failure to consider
the deterrent effect that the Act will have on potential
perpetrators of crimes against pregnant women. While the
Act does not discuss the problem in its express language, it
does provide a means for reducing the number of crimes
against women. The case of Tracy Marciniak provides an
65 See H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 87.
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id. at 87.
68 id.
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example of the possible deterrent effect the Act may have
on potential offenders.
69
Tracy Marciniak was four days from delivering her son,
Zachariah, when she was brutally attacked by her then-
husband, Glendale Black. 70 Black was fully aware that
Tracy was pregnant and that she wanted to have the child.7'
In a successful attempt to end the pregnancy, Black
punched Tracy twice in the abdomen.72 He refused to call
for paramedics and prevented Tracy from obtaining help
for herself. 73 Eventually, he relented and permitted Tracy
to go to the emergency room, where Zachariah was
delivered stillborn by Caesarian section. 74 Tracy herself
was given only 48 hours to live.75
Despite the loss of her child, Tracy managed to survive
the incident and went on to press charges against Black. 76
At the time, Wisconsin did not have a fetal homicide
statute, so Black could be charged only with assault on his
wife. Ultimately, he was convicted on that charge, but he
was not punished in any way for Zachariah's death,77 even
though his sole purpose was to cause the death of the fetus.
After recovering from her attack, Tracy spoke at a
hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
House Committee on the Judiciary. In her testimony,
Tracy said, "Before his trial, my attacker said on TV that he
would never have hit me if had thought that he could be
charged with the killing of his child., 78 Black's statement
691 Id. at 9.
70 Id.; Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 431.





76 Id. at 9.
77id.
78 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 534 n.3 (2004).
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reveals that he was more concerned with being punished
for killing his child than with actually killing his child.
While there are cases in which fetuses are killed
unintentionally, 79 the cases in which fetuses are
intentionally killed 80 spark in many a desire to punish such
reprehensible behavior. It is this type of violence against
women - violence that intentionally harms the fetuses and
the mother - that proponents of the Act seek to prevent
through the enforcement of a federal fetal homicide law.
Thus, certain types of violence against women likely
will be reduced with the passage of the Act. As Tracy
Marciniak's attacker confessed, he would not have "hit
[Tracy]" if he thought he could have been punished for the
death of "his child."81 Black did not say that he would not
have killed his child if he knew he could be punished - he
said he would not have hit his wife if he knew he could be
punished. Thus, had the Act been in existence and within
Black's knowledge in 1992, he may well not have attacked
Tracy. This is the deterrent effect that proponents of the
Act are quick to point out.
The success of this deterrent effect seems to rest on the
unfortunate fact that attackers are more worried about being
punished than about killing a fetus that the mother wants to
carry to delivery. Because some attackers fear punishment,
at least some may refrain from committing acts that would
otherwise result in death or serious bodily injury to a
pregnant woman. Inasmuch as this deterrent effect exists,
79 For example, on April 19, 1995, Carrie Lenz, a Drug Enforcement
Agency employee, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. The day
before, Carrie and her husband had chosen the name "Michael" for the
child she was carrying. H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 539 (2004). In
this case, it is probable that the death of the fetus was not within the
specific intent of the bomber.
80 For others, see Nat'l Right to Life Comm., supra note 8; H.R. REP.
No. 108-420,pt. 1, at 545.
8 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 534 n.3 (2004).
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the argument that the Act fails to address its goal of
preventing violence against women is without merit.
IV. The Assault on a Woman's Right to Choose
Finally, opponents of the Act argue that it is
inconsistent with Roe v. Wade in that it impinges on a
woman's right to choose.82 In Roe, the Supreme Court held
that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense" and concluded that "person,"
as used in the 1 4 th Amendment, does not include the
"unborn. 83 Opponents argue that state legislatures have
made every effort to "secure the recognition of fetuses as
full legal persons," 84 and that the Act is a further attempt to
confer rights upon the fetus equal to those of the woman. 85
This, they feel, is at direct odds with Roe. 
86
Such opponents also argue that the term "unborn child,"
as used in the Act, "implies that personhood begins prior to
birth or viability, as early as the moment of conception."
87
According to this argument, the use of the term "unborn
child" in the Act is in conflict with both the Constitution
and Roe, in which the Supreme Court held that "the use of
the word 'person' is such that it has application only post-
natally." 88 While opponents of the Act have correctly
interpreted Roe, they have misinterpreted the nature and
metaphysical implications of the Act.
2 Id. at 547.
83 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158, 162.
84 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 555 (2004) (listing two state court
cases where the court held that 1) a human being exists from the
moment of fertilization and implantation, and 2) a viable fetus is,
biologically speaking, a presently existing person and a living human
being). H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 555 n.5 (2004).
85 Id. at 557.
86 d.
87 id.88 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
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Here, opponents of the Act are essentially making three
distinct arguments in suggesting that the Act conflicts with
Roe. First, they argue that the Act is an attempt to confer
personhood upon fetuses. Second, they argue that the Act
attempts to confer rights upon fetuses equal to the rights of
the mother. Third, they argue that by attempting to confer
personhood on fetuses, the Act is at odds with Roe, which
says that unborn children are not persons for purposes of
the 14 th Amendment. 8 9
As to the first argument, nothing in the Act attempts to
confer personhood upon a fetus. In section (d) of the Act,
"unborn child" is defined as "a child in utero," and "a child
in utero" is further defined as a "member of the species
homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried
in the womb." 9 Thus, for the purpose of the Act, a fetus is
a member of the species "homo sapiens." This does not
imply personhood.
While the philosophical discussion of "personhood" is
far beyond the scope of this analysis, one should note that
personhood implies characteristics beyond mere
classification as a particular species. For example, many
philosophers argue that "personhood" is contingent upon
moral agency. Others argue that personhood is contingent
upon conscious self-awareness as a subject in the objective
world. Both moral agency and subjective self-awareness
are themselves contingent upon rational thought. Thus, for
many philosophers, the ability to think rationally is a
prerequisite for "personhood."
To say that an "unborn child" is a member of the
species homo sapiens merely recognizes that a fetus has a
diploid genome consisting of forty-six chromosomes and is
the reproductive progeny of homo sapien parents. 9' Such
89 Id.
90 Unborn Victims of Violence Act, § 2(d).
91 University of Washington, Chromosomes, available at:
http://www.park.edu/bhoffman/courses/bi23 1/recaps/chromosomes.htm
118
UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
nominalization and classification of a fetus in no way
implies the characteristics of personhood. In fact, given the
abovementioned characteristics of "personhood," many
philosophers would argue that even infants and young
toddlers are not "persons." If infants and young toddlers
are not "persons," in the philosophical sense, then certainly
a fetus is not a "person." To say that something has the
capacity for personhood is not to say that it is currently a
person. Thus, to say that the Act confers or attempts to
confer "personhood" upon a fetus is a misunderstanding of
the metaphysics of personhood and a misinterpretation of
the language in the Act.
As to the second argument, the Act does not attempt to
confer rights upon a fetus which are equal to the rights of
the mother. This was discussed earlier in this analysis. To
confer upon a fetus the right not to be killed except at the
election of the mother under medically legal abortion
procedures in no way suggests that such a fetus has rights
equal to or greater than those of the mother. In fact, as
discussed earlier, Roe still controls when the rights of the
fetus conflict with the rights of the mother.92 Thus, the Act
simply makes it a crime to injure or kill a fetus during the
commission of one of the sixty-eight listed offenses, which
only confers upon a fetus a limited right not to be injured or
killed without the mother's consent.
As to the third argument, if the Act does not confer
"personhood" upon a fetus, then it cannot be at odds with
the proposition in Roe, which stated that an "unborn child"
is not a person for purposes of the 1 4 th Amendment. As
discussed two paragraphs above, the Act does not attempt
to confer personhood upon a fetus. Thus, there is nothing
inconsistent in classifying a fetus as a member of the
species homo sapiens while respecting the Supreme Court's
holding that "unborn" children are not persons. The Act
92 See Roe,410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and Roe are completely consistent on this point.
Finally, an affirmative argument can be made in
defense of the Act. In 1987, Richard Smith appealed his
conviction under Georgia's fetal homicide statute to the
1 1th Circuit. 
93 He argued that the fetal homicide law
conflicted with Roe v. Wade.94 The court rejected this
argument, saying, "The proposition that Smith relies upon
in Roe v. Wade - that an unborn child is not a 'person'
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment - is
simply immaterial in the present context to whether a state
can prohibit the destruction of a fetus." 95 Thus, a fetal
homicide statute can prohibit the destruction of a fetus
without ever addressing issues of personhood or fetal
rights.
The Supreme Court has also upheld a state conviction
under a fetal homicide law in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.96 This case discussed the
constitutionality of Missouri's fetal homicide law 97 The
law declared that "the life of each human being begins at
conception," that "unborn children have protectable
interests in life, health, and well-being," and that all state
laws "shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other
persons, citizens, and residents of this state," to the extent
permitted by the Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court
rulings. 98 The Court refused to invalidate the law and held
that states are free to enforce such laws as long as they do
93 Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386 (11 th Cir. 1987).
94 Id. at 1388.
9' See id. at 1388.
96 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
97 Id.
98 Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986).
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not restrict abortion in a manner forbidden by Roe. 99
Thus, the Act does not confer rights upon a fetus that
are equal in any way to those of the mother, nor does it
confer personhood upon a fetus. In fact, the Act does not
go as far as some states' fetal homicide laws that were
upheld by the Supreme Court. Given this, there is no
reason why the Act cannot co-exist with Roe v. Wade. The
Act prohibits the unwanted destruction of a fetus by a third
person without the mother's consent during the commission
of certain federal crimes. Roe protects a mother's right to
medically terminate a fetus with her permission and within
the parameters of the law. Thus, the argument that the Act
is an assault on a woman's right to choose is misguided.
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act offers needed
protection to both fetuses and expectant mothers. Past
cases reveal the shocking trauma suffered by women at the
hands of men seeking to terminate their wanted
pregnancies. While abortion is divisive on a normative
level, most would agree that wrongful acts against a fetus
such as those described above should be punished. In fact,
an overwhelming majority of Americans agree that fetal
homicide laws are needed.'°
These laws, however, should not be mistakenly
interpreted in such a way as to threaten current abortion
rights. The Act is not only consistent with the tenets of Roe
v. Wade, it also unequivocally excludes abortion from its
scope of prosecution by express language.10' Thus, while
99 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., at
http://www.nrlc.org/Unbom-Victims/statechallenges.html (quoting
Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
100 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 535 (2004) (quoting a survey in
which 84 percent of Americans polled believe that "prosecutors should
be able to bring a homicide charge on behalf of an unborn child killed
in the womb").
101 Unborn Victims of Violence Act § 2(c) (stating that abortion for
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pro-choice advocates should not feel threatened by the Act,
pro-life advocates should not exaggerate its influence. In
fact, both parties should be content with the purposeful
results of the Act: for pro-lifers, the Act punishes the
unwanted destruction of a fetus; for pro-choice advocates,
the Act further preserves a woman's right to choose
because, if the right to choose includes the right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy, it should also include
the right to protect and preserve a wanted pregnancy.
In closing, the Act is logically and legally consistert
with all of the propositions set forth in Roe v. Wade. For
that reason, the abortion debate should turn attention away
from the Act itself, and activists' efforts should focus a
unified effort on carrying out the Act's intended purpose -
the prevention of injury and death to people like Tracy and
Zachariah Marciniak.
- W. DEREK MALCOLM
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